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UNDERSTANDING COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
THE WAKE OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION**

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Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: UNDERSTANDING
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE WAKE OF GREAT
POWER COMPETITION**

by

Benjamin M. Yourous

December 2019

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COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE WAKE OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Shifts in the policy of the United States place renewed emphasis on countering near-peer adversaries. Evidence indicates that nations commonly create, sponsor, and support insurgencies as a tool of their foreign policy. If history predicts future events, then insurgency and counterinsurgency will continue through the 21st century. By evaluating the phases of the conflict in Afghanistan, this study sought to determine a way to organize and sequence the key principles of counterinsurgency to ensure the long-term attainment of national objectives. The study tested several hypotheses against historical cases wherein a host-nation received varying degrees of external support. If these hypotheses are valid, all the counterinsurgency victories would have followed a similar sequence through their phases. However, evaluation showed that while a few key principles must occur early in a COIN campaign, most counterinsurgencies achieve success differently. Though no one sequence emerged, the study determined which key principles the United States should accomplish first, and identifies several combinations of other counterinsurgency principles to systematically test to increase the chances of attaining U.S. national objectives in counterinsurgency efforts.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE PROBLEM

The United States National Security Strategy, signed in December 2017, shifts strategic focus from non-state actors to adversarial state actors identified as revisionist states: the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and rogue states: Iran, and North Korea.¹ With the pivot to great power competition, the United States must not neglect smaller conflicts that occur in emerging or embattled nations. Since World War II, insurgencies have been the most common form of global conflict.² As countries seek to gain leverage over the United States, state-sponsored insurgencies will again become a strategic option, similar to how the Soviet Union sponsored insurgencies during the Cold War. While significant conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union included the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-Afghan War, the United States countered other Soviet-sponsored insurgencies to prevent the spread of communism, and protect U.S. interests.³ Failed attempts by the United States to counter Soviet expansion around the world saw lasting negative consequences. As an example, in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1960s–1970s, the United States attempted to counter Soviet influence in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.⁴ Of all the regions in the world affected by the spread of Communism, the United States lost its greatest political leverage in sub-Saharan Africa due to the failures in counterinsurgency efforts to deter Soviet expansion.

Similarly, violent Communist expansion occurred during the same period in Latin and South America in Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Venezuela,

¹ White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

² T. X. Hammes, “Why Study Small Wars?,” *Small Wars Journal* 1 (April 2005): 1.

³ James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, *Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide* (ABC-CLIO, 2012), ix.

⁴ Arnold and Wiener, *Cold War*, 6–8.

Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and Colombia.⁵ However, the United States more successfully countered these insurgencies in all but Cuba due to the concerted diplomatic and military efforts applied in the region after lessons learned from the United States intervention in Vietnam.⁶ The 16 insurgencies identified in Africa and Latin and South America, regardless of scale, indicate that great power competition and insurgencies are invariably linked. In response to the future expected increase of state-sponsored insurgencies given this connection, the United States government, specifically the Department of State and Department of Defense would benefit from an increased understanding of how the key elements of a counterinsurgency campaign should be sequenced from pre-campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term attainment of national objectives.

Currently, U.S. guidance and doctrine from the Department of State and the Department of Defense does not specify a method to guide decisionmakers throughout the life-cycle of a counterinsurgency campaign. The lack of guidance contributes to the increasing costs paid in blood and treasure by the United States without attaining desired national objectives. The *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* outlines theoretical concepts and considerations for counterinsurgency, yet it fails to bridge theory and concepts into a logical sequence as evidenced by this passage from the manual:⁷

Ideally, the overall COIN strategy should be devised by the affected nation, as their understanding of it and their commitment to it will be key to success. If possible, the role of the U.S. should, therefore, be one of advising and assisting the affected nation to improve its strategy (if it already has one) or to help it write one from scratch (if it does not). If the latter is the case, the U.S. should also strive to build up the strategy development capacity of the affected government.

As previously discussed, the affected government may not be particularly eager to address some of the underlying causes of insurgency and so may

⁵ Arnold and Wiener, *Cold War*, 121–23.

⁶ Arnold and Wiener, *Cold War*, 123.

⁷ Department of State, *United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2009), 35–48, www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt.

find U.S. suggestions unpalatable. If so, the U.S. will need to work with the affected government to encourage it to take the necessary steps.

Once the affected nation has a viable COIN strategy, the U.S. should determine where American resources and actions can best be applied to contribute to the host nation's goals.⁸

Joint Publication 1-02 defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives,” which as evidenced above, the State Department's guidance provides no universally accepted strategy.⁹ Instead, it instructs that the United States government relies on a host nation to develop a strategy for securing its country. One reason the United States government becomes involved in counterinsurgency campaigns, though, is due in part to the host nation's inability to defend its population, borders, or interests without U.S. support. Ideally, the United States government should support other countries as they attempt to resolve internal conflicts, but it must be unwilling to inherit and adopt a poor strategy. Instead, the United States government should determine the quality of the current strategy and, if necessary, adjust an ineffective strategy to enable counterinsurgency efforts. More importantly, the United States government should have the tools necessary to create a counterinsurgency strategy should the host nation's fail.

The Department of Defense, in *Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, describes counterinsurgency strategy development as a joint process between the host nation and the United States government.¹⁰ It provides military planners flexibility in determining the amount of support the United States government provides to the host nation, given that country's capabilities and the challenges it is addressing.¹¹ Flexible

⁸ Department of State, *United States Counterinsurgency Guide*, 44.

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), 277, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/misc/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/jps/jp1_02.pdf.

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, JP 3-24 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), III-16, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, III-4.

military strategy alone cannot achieve U.S. national objectives, according to the *JP 3-24*, because, “COIN requires a host nation political strategy that establishes, reinforces, and sustains the control, legitimacy, and effectiveness of its government while reducing that of the insurgency. The USG may exercise many forms of national power in support of the HN, which are often just as important to COIN as the JFC’s ability to apply lethal force.”¹² Military flexibility and subsequent success in counterinsurgency are dependent on the implementation of the other instruments of national power, which requires action by the Department of State.¹³ Reliance on the host nation for strategy development and implementation limits the chances to do so.

Presently, the United States applies two widely accepted approaches toward counterinsurgency campaigns: the enemy-centric and the population-centric approach.¹⁴ However, beyond broad ideas and concepts, both the Department of State and Department of Defense guidance provides limited details on strategy development and the sequence to apply the fundamentals of counterinsurgency. The continuing conflict in Afghanistan highlights doctrinal limitations, where the United States government is attempting to negotiate a political resolution with the Taliban to end America’s longest war, without really knowing the status of the conflict.¹⁵

As the United States continues to support friendly nations facing security challenges, creating a shared understanding of how to develop a counterinsurgency strategy for the Department of State and Department of Defense planners can bridge theory and execution. It would positively impact the United States government’s ability to effectively engage in counterinsurgency efforts as needed, thereby achieving the desired political outcomes and attaining national objectives. What cannot become routine are conflicts similar to the one in Afghanistan, where the United States government’s proposed

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, I–4.

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*. III–5.

¹⁴ Department of State, *United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide*, 12.

¹⁵ Vanda Fellab-Brown, “The US-Taliban Negotiations Breakthrough: What It Means and What Lies Ahead,” *Brookings*, January 29, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/29/the-us-taliban-negotiations-breakthrough-what-it-means-and-what-lies-ahead>.

withdrawal date is somewhere within the next three to five years, adding to an already 18-year commitment.¹⁶ This study attempts to fill the gap in doctrine and counterinsurgency strategy by developing a universally viable way of executing a counterinsurgency campaign throughout its life cycle to prevent the United States government from finding itself in extended conflicts with no foreseeable end similar to Afghanistan now.

Given the National Security Strategy's shift of strategic priorities, the identification of the sequence gap in doctrine, and the United States' continuation with the conflict in Afghanistan, the following research question is presented: **"How should the key elements of a COIN campaign be sequenced from pre-campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term attainment of national objectives?"** The goal of this study is to develop a viable option of organizing an effective U.S. counterinsurgency strategy that explains not only the steps to take but the order to sequence each action. When applied, this option can ensure future U.S. counterinsurgency endeavors yield the desired results by providing decision-makers the pathway to establish the necessary conditions during each phase of a counterinsurgency campaign.

B. THE PROCESS

The following six steps guide the study to answer the research question.

1. Identify a Viable Counterinsurgency Sequence
2. Determine Key Elements of Counterinsurgency
3. Create a Model to Understand Data
4. Analyze Data and Develop Hypotheses
5. Compare Data to Previous Research
6. Analyze Findings and Develop Recommendations

1. Identify a Viable Counterinsurgency Sequence

This study intends to show that victorious insurgencies have historically followed a generalizable pattern to achieve their desired objectives. The pattern emphasizes the interrelationship between the population, insurgent, and the counterinsurgent throughout a

¹⁶ Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Julian E. Barnes, "Under Peace Plan, U.S. Military Would Exit Afghanistan Within Five Years," *The New York Times*, March 1, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/us/politics/afghanistan-military-withdrawal.html>.

conflict's life-cycle. As a foundation, the interrelationship of the three groups frames the sequence in which insurgencies follow through their life span. Understanding the pattern of an insurgency provides a blueprint that can be used to reverse engineer a counterinsurgency sequence. It is the most critical step of the process because not only does it serve as the foundation for all subsequent steps, but it explains why and when specific actions are necessary during the campaign.

2. Determine Key Elements of Counterinsurgency

There are time-proven principles a counterinsurgent must satisfy to achieve desired objectives in a counterinsurgency campaign. These principles include factors that relate to pre-campaign conditions, civil and military operations, and post-campaign efforts to stabilize and retain the long-term goals of a counterinsurgency endeavor. Principles are drawn from leading research by academics on, and successful practitioners of counterinsurgency. The goal is to identify principles that provide direction and focus but do not limit the flexibility and creativity of decision-makers.

3. Create a Model to Understand Data

This study's methodological approach uses Professor Gordon McCormick's Theoretical Diamond Model, and the 26 factors from Chris Paul's *Paths to Victory* COIN scorecard to create a model to analyze counterinsurgency.¹⁷ McCormick's Diamond Model provides a model that similarly follows the pattern determined in step one, while Paul's 26 factors provide a list of counterinsurgency principles that satisfy the information gathered from step two. The two components, when overlaid, create a model to help interpret how elements of a counterinsurgency campaign should be sequenced. The two models approach counterinsurgency differently. McCormick's Diamond Model relies on a theoretical, qualitative design of sequencing counterinsurgency into five phases, while Paul's work reduces the complexities of 71 historical cases of counterinsurgency into

¹⁷ Gordon McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 11, 2018); Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013).

26 quantifiable factors that, when scored, were perfectly correlated with the outcome of each conflict.¹⁸ By using both methods, the approach here uses qualitative and quantitative concepts to understand what, when, and why specific actions are critical in a counterinsurgency campaign. The literature gathered in steps one and two, on insurgent patterns and principles in counterinsurgency, respectively, guide the process between the two models. The approach inserts each of the 26 factors into one of the five phases of McCormick's Model. If both McCormick's Model and the 26 factors are valid, then a valid counterinsurgency sequence of key elements will be presented.

4. Analyze Data and Develop Hypotheses

This step uses the on-going conflict in Afghanistan as a case study to test the efficacy of the model. The Afghan case study analyzes three national-level assessments conducted over five years to identify patterns of success, regression, and failure. The data for the study came from two sources. First, the study used data from the RAND Corporation, which conducted the first two national-level assessments in 2013 and 2015, respectively, scoring the conflict in Afghanistan using the 26 factors from *Paths to Victory*.¹⁹ The second set of data came from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, where students from the Defense Analysis Department, under the direction of Dr. Hy Rothstein, conducted applied research in support of the Commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A).²⁰ The applied research conducted a similar assessment, using open source data to conduct a national level assessment utilizing the *Paths to Victory* scorecard.²¹ When consolidated, the data provides a temporal display of counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan over a multi-year period, indicating areas where the United States,

¹⁸ McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare"; Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 13.

¹⁹ Christopher Paul et al., *Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013); Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke, *Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

²⁰ Hy Rothstein and Michael Richardson, "Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan" (Applied Research for Commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force [Afghanistan], November 27, 2018).

²¹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*; Rothstein and Richardson, "Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan."

NATO allies, and the Afghan government have either successfully or unsuccessfully addressed critical factors relevant to counterinsurgency. Overlaying the five years of scoring with McCormick's Theoretical Diamond Model explains why the output of the factors has resulted in the conditions that currently exist in Afghanistan. From this process, a series of hypotheses were developed, attempting to explain a way of sequencing the principles of a counterinsurgency campaign, while outlining the consequences by failing to follow this process.

5. Compare Data to Previous Research

The most thorough and objective means of testing the hypotheses developed in the previous step is to compare the Afghan case study against other counterinsurgency cases. During its development, the authors of *Paths to Victory* evaluated and scored 205 phases of its 71 cases, where significant changes in the COIN forces effort to impact the conflict determined each phase.²² The method in step three using the Afghanistan case study replicates the temporal analysis available for the 71 cases from *Paths to Victory*. The similarity of data collection enables the study to compare the Afghan case study against the 71 cases objectively. Since *Paths to Victory* accurately predicted the outcome of each of the 71 cases using its COIN Scorecard, the patterns and trends derived from the comparison can objectively validate or invalidate each hypothesis.²³ This study will evaluate one category of cases available in *Paths Victory*: the 28 External Actor-Support Case Studies.²⁴ The 28 External Actor-Support Case Studies provide insight into situations most similar to what the United States may face in future conflicts. Additionally, it focuses on the key elements and campaign sequencing requisite for the United States to recommend and implement as the external supporter to host-nation counterinsurgency effort.

These cases, by phase, will be inserted into the model developed in step three and compared accordingly to the Afghanistan case study. This comparison will test a series of hypotheses developed in step four. The point of the comparison is not to redo what the

²² Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 16.

²³ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 16.

²⁴ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 19–20, 74–78.

authors of *Paths to Victory* have already accomplished in understanding what factors determine the outcome of counterinsurgencies. Instead, the goal is to observe what patterns of sequences have occurred historically and to identify what sequencing yielded the best results. Ideally, a pattern will emerge from the analysis. The Afghan case study provides a current conflict to qualify these findings by highlighting the current counterinsurgency strategy discrepancies. The modeling will explain why this sequencing is critical, given its foundation in McCormick's Theory of Victory. Then the cases will be compared to one another by phase. If the hypotheses are correct, the cases will show the cases progressed through their counterinsurgency campaigns similarly. If all conditions are satisfied, this study will determine how the elements of a COIN campaign should be sequenced from pre-campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term attainment of national objectives.

6. Analyze Findings and Develop Recommendations

The effort of the previous five steps is not an attempt to provide options for strategic and operational leaders to change or salvage U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Instead, this study seeks to provide senior leaders within the Department of State and the Department of Defense an understanding of options in sequencing elements of counterinsurgency from its inception to its completion for future application. Moreover, it will explain why these elements matter, and what the negative consequences of not correctly addressing each key element can do to undermine the counterinsurgency campaign. Understanding what, why, and when key elements should be sequenced ensures that the United States government establishes the necessary conditions before, during, and after a counterinsurgency campaign to ensure long term attainment of U.S. national objectives. These conditions, when satisfied, prevent the unnecessary losses now associated with the Afghanistan campaign. Furthermore, it provides decision-makers with the necessary understanding of counterinsurgency challenges to make informed decisions on potential engagement.

C. SUMMARY

If great power competition is again the environment, then the United States government can assume revisionist and rogue states will use all means to gain leverage

over the United States. If history indicates future events, then the United States government can expect these state actors to support insurgencies as a foreign policy tool. Given the gap in current U.S. guidance and doctrine for conducting counterinsurgency and the expected increase in insurgencies, the need for understanding how to sequence key elements of a counterinsurgency campaign is paramount to the security of the United States and its global partners. This study seeks to fill the gap in counterinsurgency sequencing by using the data from the war in Afghanistan to understand and refine the U.S. government's approach to counterinsurgency, providing a viable way to ensure long-term attainment of national objectives from counterinsurgency efforts. Simultaneously, this study provides the U.S. government an understanding of how adversaries will capitalize on vulnerable countries to foster and support insurgencies to benefit their foreign policy objectives.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The following literature review summarizes concepts of counterinsurgency and determines there is a consensus amongst scholars on the actions a counterinsurgent force and government must take to achieve success in a counterinsurgency campaign. However, little evidence suggests a sequence exists as a one size fits all approach to order these principles. Most counterinsurgency practitioners and theorists tend to lean toward the same conclusion drawn by David Kilcullen that “counterinsurgency success depends on adaptability in the face of a rapidly evolving insurgent threat and a changing environment.”²⁵ Since the enemy and environment constantly evolve, what is of greater importance is remaining ahead of the enemy, at least in terms of strategy implementation, instead of being tied to a proscribed strategy.

Conceptually, Kilcullen’s approach mimics what strategist John Boyd championed with the development of the OODA Loop, where the decision-maker, who could observe, orient, decide, and act within their adversaries’ OODA Loop, gained a marked advantage in combat.²⁶ The challenge with Boyd’s model, in the case of counterinsurgency, is the situation is not one of a pitched, aerial battle between fighter pilots locked in intense dogfighting, but an environment championed by the protracted nature of insurgent tactics. In that protraction, pitched battles can be rare and of little strategic value, serving only as a means to shape the political landscape in the desired area to gain an advantage over an opponent.

There is value in Boyd’s model for decision-makers. Leaders at all levels would certainly benefit in a counterinsurgency campaign, should they be able to conduct their operations within the enemy’s OODA loop. However, sole reliance on Boyd’s concept can devolve into leaders making decisions using “off the cuff” or “figure it out as we go” mentalities. While certainly there are times when those approaches have yielded positive

²⁵ David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20.

²⁶ Frans P. B. Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd* (London: Routledge, 2007), 5–6, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203088869>.

results, they rarely provide stability desired in a campaign. Using those approaches provides little reference to successors because knowledge resides with one individual, or there was no transferrable method to decision-making. New leadership is unaware of how the conflict has evolved, grown, and morphed during that time. Usually, it creates a scenario similar to the situation in Afghanistan where new units rotating into the country learn the same lessons and reestablish the same ground already gained by previous units. Often this is referred to as the United States fighting the same war in Afghanistan 18 different times, or fighting 18 different one-year wars.

Given the challenge presented by Kilcullen, this study's theoretical framework seeks to determine a more objective way to view both key elements of a counterinsurgency campaign and their sequencing, without abandoning the principle of adaptability he championed.²⁷ The goal is to fill the void that exists within a counterinsurgency strategy and provide an objective means of campaign sequencing to prevent the situation in Afghanistan from happening in the future. The sequence may not yield the desired objectives in every counterinsurgency campaign, but at a minimum, it prevents the United States from losing sight of where it is, and what its goals were at the outset of the campaign.

Since there is no widely accepted approach for how counterinsurgency should be sequenced, this study builds its theoretical framework in three steps. The first is defining counterinsurgency to truly understand the demands these conflicts require not only the militaries fighting them but the governments supporting them. The second is developing a sequence that counterinsurgency can follow. Since there is no widely accepted pattern for counterinsurgency sequencing, this study creates a counterinsurgency sequence by using a successful insurgency blueprint to reverse engineer a sequence. The third step is to draw on historical examples from previously successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Building the theoretical framework in this way shapes the approach used in the following sections by insulating the approach with as much truth as possible.

²⁷ Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 20.

A. DEFINING COUNTERINSURGENCY

Both the Department of State's *United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide* and the Department of Defense's *Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency* define counterinsurgency as "the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes."²⁸ In the *JP 3-24*, an insurgency is defined as "the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region."²⁹ When combined, counterinsurgency, as the United States defines it, is applying all the civil and military capability within the U.S. arsenal to prevent an insurgency from shifting the current political homeostasis of an area.

Perhaps a more appropriate way to explain counterinsurgency is first to understand the type of war counterinsurgency manifests itself as, which is far more complicated than traditional war. Robert Trinquier, counterinsurgency theorist, and former French Army Colonel with experience in World War II, the First Indochina War, the Algerian War, and the Katanga Rebellion defines this as, "Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the *overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime*."³⁰ Warfare is no longer fought between two armies on a distant battlefield, competing in tactics, materiel, and manpower, but a comprehensive blend of multiple disciplines, mostly non-military, to achieve desired objectives. Trinquier continues by saying, "To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked—ideological, social, religious, economic—any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered."³¹

²⁸ Department of State, *United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide*, 2.; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, xxiii.

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, ix.

³⁰ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, trans. Daniel Lee (Westport: Praeger Security International, 1964), 6.

³¹ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 6.

Modern warfare is a complement of all actions taken by a militarily weaker adversary to exploit seams in the population to shift the political status of an affected area to achieve intended goals. Counterinsurgency is the reverse. Trinquier's explanation explicitly describes the adversary in modern warfare and the focus of their energy, where present doctrine only describes the actions to take and the reasons for doing so. Trinquier explains how and why the adversary fights in this fashion that is different from a conventional military conflict. Embracing his explanation of modern warfare makes it possible to understand what counterinsurgency is designed to combat: the enemy's ability to gain political control of contested space.

B. UNDERSTANDING THE INSURGENT PATTERN

There has been a noticeable increase in the success of insurgencies in the last 75 years, reinforcing why understanding insurgency is critical not only to the study, but also the United States government. Max Boot, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, in his book *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to Present* explains the rate of insurgency success between 1775 and 1945 increased from 25.5 percent to 40.3 percent between 1945 and 2013.³² He believes the reason for the insurgent success stems from public opinion, specifically the ability to influence public opinion, enabling insurgencies to survive.³³ In a post-World War II environment, the insurgent pattern is growing increasingly successful, and its success is more tied to the population than it was before, insofar as public opinion is more accessible to the insurgent now than in previous generations or centuries.

In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu writes, "What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."³⁴ Using this principle as a guideline, understanding how an

³² Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to Present*, 1st ed. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 559.

³³ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 559–60.

³⁴ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). p. 77.

insurgency organizes itself to attack an enemy's strategy produces a framework for sequencing the key elements of a counterinsurgency campaign. Even the Department of Defense manual, *JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, specifies that U.S. counterinsurgency efforts should attack an insurgent's strategy.³⁵

Insurgent strategy, when reduced to its purest form, places effort in three areas: the conflicted population, the counterinsurgent, and the international community. Fundamentally, insurgencies engage these three population groups in sequence or attempt to address the three groups in order because of the evolution an insurgency follows. At their inception, insurgencies cannot match the military strength of the counterinsurgent force and must tailor their approach, following the identified pattern until the military disparity between the insurgent and counterinsurgent is reduced or nullified. Since insurgencies are militarily weaker than government forces, they must find ways to offset the disparity to render the military capability of the counterinsurgent irrelevant or ineffective. In *On Guerrilla War*, Mao Zedong provides insight into how an insurgency offsets this disparity in his three phases of protracted war: Phase I (organization, consolidation, and preservation), Phase II (progressive expansion), and Phase III (decision, or destruction of the enemy).³⁶ Arguably, Mao's teachings, initially published in 1937, became the standard framework used by many insurgencies around the world.

The first phase of the insurgency requires an insurgent to gain and maintain support from the population.³⁷ In his 1975 work, *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict*, Andrew Mack articulates this point by determining a set of conditions the insurgency must achieve to create asymmetry, thereby enabling the insurgent to win.³⁸ Specifically, the weaker opponents defeat the militarily powerful when the insurgent refuses to confront the more powerful enemy on his terms and receives

³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, II-4.

³⁶ Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1961). 21-22.

³⁷ Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 22.

³⁸ Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (1975): 176, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009880>.

support from the population.³⁹ Sustainable popular support both preserves an insurgency and creates the asymmetry needed to counter the state.

The relationship between the insurgent and the population suggests the population is the center of gravity in an insurgency. The *JP 5-0 Joint Planning* manual defines a center of gravity as “a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”⁴⁰ More narrowly defined, the population’s political will to support the conflict is the center of gravity in an insurgency. While the *JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency* manual explains the population is not always the center of gravity, it does say, “the population will typically become a primary factor in the success or failure of the insurgency.”⁴¹ The counterinsurgent must not look beyond the population during a counterinsurgency campaign. The population’s political will provides the ends, ways, and means of insurgent strategy. In his work *Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model*, H. Richard Yarger describes ends, ways, means as “the ends are ‘objectives,’ the ways are the ‘concepts’ for accomplishing the objectives, and the means are the ‘resources’ for supporting the concepts.”⁴² Therefore, control of the ability to influence or manipulate political will is requisite in an insurgency. Without popular support that allows an insurgent to shift political will, the insurgent cannot create the asymmetry Mack is describing in his work.⁴³

Phase two of the insurgency seeks to create a set of conditions isolating the counterinsurgent from the population. The population consists of two primary groups: the counterinsurgent’s home population, and the population in the conflict space. Mack uses the French involvement in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 to describe the shift in political

³⁹ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 196.

⁴⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Planning*. JP 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), xxii., https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0_20171606.pdf.

⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, I–5.

⁴² Harry R. Yarger, “Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” in *Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 110, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a467691.pdf>.

⁴³ Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 177–178.

sentiment of the French population as evidence of the impact of isolating the counterinsurgent.⁴⁴ Isolating the French government from its population reduced the French resolve to counter Algerian resistance. As insurgencies and by extension, counterinsurgencies continue to fight for control of political space, a break down in political support across the two groups isolates the counterinsurgent. Mack refers to this occurring due to the difference in commitment level between the insurgent and counterinsurgent.⁴⁵ Gil Merom, in *The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria*, describes the unfavorable shift in French political opinion for the war in Algeria throughout the 1950s as a leading cause for the failure of French foreign policy objectives.⁴⁶ Achieving military success paid few dividends because of the shift in French social consciousness to no longer supporting the war effort made tactical or operational military successes irrelevant.⁴⁷ The United States saw the same decline in support during the Vietnam War.⁴⁸ As the civil-military divide widens, the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency force declines. The insurgent contributes to the isolation of the counterinsurgent by creating a disparity in commitment level, and elevating the costs of the conflict to more than a nation's population is willing to bear.⁴⁹

Throughout the insurgency, the counterinsurgent must prevent the insurgent from isolating the counterinsurgent from the population. In the introduction to Roger Trinquier's *Modern Warfare*, Bernard Fall writes,

In revolutionary war...the allegiance of the civilian population becomes one of the most vital objectives of the whole struggle. This is indeed the key message that Trinquier seeks to impress upon his reader: Military tactics

⁴⁴ Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 180.

⁴⁵ Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 185.

⁴⁶ Gil Merom, "The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria," *Armed Forces & Society* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 601. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0403000405>.

⁴⁷ Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 181–182.

⁴⁸ Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 560.

⁴⁹ Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 185.

and hardware are all well and good, but they are really quite useless if one has lost the confidence of the population among whom one is fighting.⁵⁰

The schism between the population and counterinsurgent occurs because the counterinsurgent seeks decisive military action, while insurgents aim to manipulate the population into action.⁵¹ As a result, the population becomes the target of decisive military action by the counterinsurgent, isolating the counterinsurgent from the population.

The third phase of the insurgency requires the insurgent to seek legitimacy with the international community and acquire external support. They execute this much in the same way the host-nation seeks legitimacy and foreign assistance. Continuing in the pattern of an insurgency, Jeffrey Record, in *Why the Strong Lose*, asserts that if an insurgency maintains the stronger will and superior insurgent strategy over its opponent, and receives external assistance, the insurgency will succeed in defeating a democracy.⁵² States, particularly in the Cold War, routinely provided support to insurgencies to further their national objectives around the world.⁵³ This trend has continued since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In their book, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, Daniel Byman et al. write, “out of the 74 post—Cold War insurgencies surveyed, state support, we believe, played a major role in initiating, sustaining, bringing to victory, or otherwise assisting 44 of them.”⁵⁴ In seeking assistance, the insurgent now competes with the current government as an equal, effectively challenging, and potentially negating the government’s political control of the population.

Given the insurgent pattern and the keys that make an insurgency successful, the counterinsurgent pattern should not react to an insurgent strategy. Instead, it should proactively target the population to create an asymmetry between the counterinsurgent and

⁵⁰ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, ix.

⁵¹ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*. 16–18.

⁵² Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” *Parameters* XXXV, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 17, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/198173907/>.

⁵³ Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001): xiii.

⁵⁴ Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, 9.

the insurgent. Counterinsurgency should undermine the insurgent's strategy following three tenets: achieve the support of the local population, isolate the insurgent from the population, and retain international legitimacy and support. In application, the counterinsurgency sequence deliberately places the insurgent in the periphery, ensuring to focus the bulk of its energy and effort on the population conflicted population. Since the insurgency begins militarily disadvantaged, the approach remains strategically acceptable, providing time and space for other relevant instruments of national power to be leveraged and take root. This sequence perhaps best accomplishes what David Galula expresses about asymmetry in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, when he writes, "There is an asymmetry between the opposite camps of a revolutionary war. This phenomenon results from the very nature of war, from the disproportion of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between their assets and their liabilities."⁵⁵ The counterinsurgent sequence outlined here nullifies the insurgents' ability to create and maintain the necessary asymmetry because doing so would force the insurgents to resort to terrorism, isolating them further from the population.⁵⁶

C. KEY ELEMENTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Given the sequence identified by reviewing and understanding insurgency, the next step is determining what elements of counterinsurgency to overlay in the pattern. While there are numerous examples of successful counterinsurgency practices, this section seeks to identify the broadest applicable principles of counterinsurgency practice. The broader the action, the more applicable they are to counterinsurgency practitioners because they allow for the maximum flexibility needed in the complex environment Kilcullen describes in *Counterinsurgency*.⁵⁷ Reasonably, though, given the protracted and decentralized nature of these conflicts and how many decision-makers will be required to make quick decisions, there must be something that unifies and preserves their vision and focus. Robert

⁵⁵ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 3.

⁵⁶ Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," 194–195.

⁵⁷ Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 20.

R. Reilly, a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, in *No Substitute for Substance*, writes, “The job of U.S. public diplomacy, then, should be to advance the justice of our cause—our “principles and values”—while simultaneously undermining our opponent’s claim to the same. Any activity that is not engaged in doing at least one of these two things is not public diplomacy.”⁵⁸ He is discussing the importance of two critical components of U.S. public diplomacy: the unity of purpose and narrative. When applied to counterinsurgency, which is a Department of State-led initiative, and thereby a diplomatic effort, unity of purpose enables flexibility and agility in a campaign while synchronizing that effort to the overarching narrative of justice and virtue. Unity of purpose from the U.S. government’s highest leaders down to the individual diplomat or military officer is requisite to success in a counterinsurgency campaign. Logically, the same principle applies to the host nation’s justice and values whom the United States supports. Unity of purpose, ensures all parties involved remain focused on the desired objectives the United States seeks to achieve by engaging in a counterinsurgency campaign. A consistent narrative executed in this fashion targets and messages the conflicted population and the international community, promoting the justice of the United States and host nation’s cause while preserving the counterinsurgency campaign’s legitimacy.

There must be a viable means of communicating with the population in order to convey a narrative. In *Explosive Connections? Mass media, social media, and geography of collective violence in African states*, Professor T. Camber Warren finds substantial evidence between media influence and levels of collective violence in 24 African countries.⁵⁹ He analyzed two forms of communication, centralized radio and cell phone access, and the impact of geography on the states’ ability to convey information to the population.⁶⁰ Within the analysis, states, through vertical mass communication by way of

⁵⁸ Robert R. Reilly, “No Substitute for Substance,” *The Journal of International Security Affairs* 0, no. 17 (Fall 2009): 10, http://www.ciaonet.org.libproxy.nps.edu/journal_issues/660.

⁵⁹ T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of Collective Violence in African States,” *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 3 (2015): 297–311.

⁶⁰ Warren. “Explosive Connections,” 297.

radio, can reduce levels of collective violence through messages of unification and peace.⁶¹ The findings demonstrate the necessity of strategic communication and messaging from the state to the population. Doing so reinforces the unity of purpose the state is attempting to achieve while promoting the narrative of the counterinsurgent force.

When the United States government commits to a counterinsurgency, choosing the appropriate composition of diplomatic and military personnel matters. Traditional military campaigns tend to use a top-down, authoritarian approach, but according to Andrew J. Gawthorpe, in *All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy*, degrading the legitimacy of an insurgency is very challenging and most often impossible from a top-down approach.⁶² If all insurgency is local, then the need to sever the relationship at the local level is a must for the counterinsurgent. Therefore, the type of counterinsurgent employed must be capable of addressing problems at the local level to reduce rebel legitimacy. According to Doctor Kalev Sepp, who at the time had recently returned from the staff of Multinational Forces-Iraq, in *Best Practices in Counterinsurgency*, coined, “In the U.S. Armed Forces, only the Special Forces (SF) are expressly organized and trained for counterinsurgent warfare and advising indigenous forces.”⁶³ When employed, U.S. Army SF allows diplomatic and military planners to engage at local levels to reduce rebel legitimacy without establishing an authoritarian top-down approach that undermines the counterinsurgency effort. Special Forces units need only a small footprint, and their employment prevents the U.S. military from overcommitting conventional troops while forcing the host-nation to take a leading role. Special Forces also retains the ability to train, advise, and build the capacity of partner forces to combat threats. Since SF can work aptly through and with partner forces, a byproduct of their relationship is a grasp of the environment at the local level.

⁶¹ Warren, “Explosive Connections,” 308.

⁶² Andrew J. Gawthorpe, “All Counterinsurgency Is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28, no. 4–5 (July 26, 2017): 844, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1322330>.

⁶³ Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review*, (2005): 11.

Understanding the environment is a stepping stone for intelligence collection and control of the narrative. According to Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl, in *Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency*, precise knowledge of the environment is requisite for the intelligence collection and application processes.⁶⁴ There is an inherent challenge of discriminating between the enemy and civilians in an insurgency because the nature of the conflict is different from other forms of warfare.⁶⁵ Any action without thoroughly vetted intelligence may result in the misidentification of the enemy or be carried out against civilians, who are equally the focus of the insurgent and counterinsurgent. Mistakes in intelligence undermine the counterinsurgent's effort. Precise use of intelligence allows the counterinsurgent to shape operations that serve multiple purposes. Intelligence allows the counterinsurgent to control the narrative and own the initiative against the insurgent. Intelligence-based operations equally safeguard the population from threats while demonstrating the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent force.

Intelligence-based operations, and more broadly intelligence collection, suffer one significant limitation. Many insurgencies benefit from external support and sanctuary, much in the same way the United States supports host nations in counterinsurgency efforts. While intelligence collection can identify external support, there may be little the military action arm of the counterinsurgency can do to address the problem. In *Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups*, Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David Cunningham attempted to understand the relationship between rebel groups and their external supporters.⁶⁶ Their findings indicate that insurgencies are more likely to receive external support if the state receives external support.⁶⁷ Meaning that the United States should expect another country, potentially a revisionist or rogue state, to provide external

⁶⁴ Eliot Cohen et al., "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86, no. 2, (April 2006): 50, ProQuest.

⁶⁵ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 26.

⁶⁶ Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups," *International Organization* 65, no. 4 (October 2011): 709–44, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000233>.

⁶⁷ Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups," 734.

support to insurgencies solely because the United States is aiding the host nation. Opportunistic statecraft against U.S. efforts in counterinsurgency must be addressed at the tactical and strategic level to ensure what Trinquier describes as a “durable peace.”⁶⁸ Moreover, isolating the insurgent and reducing external support limits the complexities of an already complex environment.

Within the framework of key elements of counterinsurgency, this section identifies dynamic leadership, unity of purpose, narrative, strategic communication, well-suited forces, intelligence, and reducing external support as the key elements that enable a counterinsurgency campaign to succeed. That is not to say these are the only principles of counterinsurgency, but their broad nature satisfies two critical components: their acceptability and applicability to most counterinsurgencies and they do not limit, but enable individuals to make decisions and take action. Furthermore, based on the evidence, all of these principles must be present in successful counterinsurgency. When overlaid with the counterinsurgent pattern that focuses on gaining support from the population, isolating the insurgent, and retaining legitimacy from the international community, the key elements produce a pathway for counterinsurgency sequencing.

⁶⁸ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 98.

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III. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter explains the genesis of the model used in the remainder of the study. The information is sequenced chronologically, covering a period from July 2018 to December 2018. In doing so, it shows that the final product spawned from an operational requirement from a forward Special Operations command, SOJTF-A. The commander and his staff provided guidance and direction to set this effort in motion. Furthermore, this section highlights the efforts of nearly two dozen students and faculty, who provided input and criticism during the model's development, to provide the most objective and complete product back to the command and operational force. Outlining the process undertaken satisfies two things: first, it documents the efforts of all the personnel who participated and contributed in the combined effort, and second, it shows where the model started, where it changed, and how it evolved into its current form. Additionally, the approach uses data collected from the previous applied research, and the process identifies how and where that data was collected.

B. BACKGROUND

As previously described in the introduction, this study's methodological approach uses Professor Gordon McCormick's Theoretical Diamond Model, and the 26 factors from *Paths to Victory* to create a model to analyze counterinsurgency.⁶⁹ However, the model itself grew and evolved over six months of applied research from July to December 2018. Initially, students from the Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, developed an assessment tool, built from McCormick's Theoretical Diamond Model and the COIN Scorecard from *Paths to Victory*, as applied research on behalf of the Special Operations Joint Task Force—Afghanistan (SOJTF-A), in August 2018. The students, comprised of Department of Navy and U.S. Army officers and non-commissioned officers under the direction of Dr. Hy Rothstein, senior lecturer, and Colonel

⁶⁹ Gordon McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."; Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 249.

Michael Richardson, U.S. Army, Chair for Special Operations Forces, developed the tool to support command directed priorities from the SOJTF-A Commander in Afghanistan.

The tool sought to assess conditions nationally and sub-nationally in Afghanistan to identify areas with suitable conditions for the United States to begin negotiations for a peaceful settlement with the Taliban. Development supported the commander's priority of achieving peaceful reconciliation with the Taliban through a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, the tool attempted to identify not only where the conditions were suitable for negotiations, but why those conditions were satisfactory. The idea would be to replicate successful conditions throughout Afghanistan and achieve peace, one district, province, or region at a time. Conversely, a thorough understanding of ideal or suitable conditions at the tactical and operational levels within Afghanistan would prevent U.S. and NATO forces from entering into negotiations with the Taliban when the tool determined the conditions were not favorable to the United States. The goal was to prevent U.S. forces from making unacceptable concessions to the Taliban to achieve peace. The applied research team hypothesized that, when executed, the assessment tool of Professor McCormick's Model, with the *Paths to Victory's* 26 factors provided an accurate, measurable assessment tool to determine the conditions in an area before entering into a negotiation. If conditions are not suitable to enter a negotiation, the tool identified where within the McCormick Model counterinsurgency efforts were failing.

C. GORDON MCCORMICK'S THEORETICAL DIAMOND MODEL

Professor Gordon McCormick's Theoretical Diamond Model is a linear approach for a state to successfully defeat an insurgent force by gaining political control of the population.⁷⁰ It breaks up the activities of counterinsurgency into five phases: Secure the Population, Separate Insurgents from the Population, Target Insurgents, Disconnect Insurgents from External Support, Target External Support.⁷¹ According to McCormick's theory, actions taken by the counterinsurgent must be executed in succession, beginning

⁷⁰ McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

⁷¹ McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

with securing the population and ending with targeting external support to defeat an insurgent force.⁷² Therefore, any effort to address the other four phases before addressing the first is wasted energy and will not achieve the desired outcomes.⁷³ When evaluating the outcomes of counterinsurgency campaigns, this model explains why the activity conducted by the COIN force succeeded or failed. Success in the previous phase is the only way to achieve success in the subsequent phase adequately. Figure 1 is a depiction of how the COIN force and the insurgent forces are competing against one another to gain political control of the population.




Figure 1. Gordon McCormick's Theoretical Diamond Model.⁷⁴

⁷² McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

⁷³ McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

⁷⁴ Source: McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

D. CHRISTOPHER PAUL'S *PATHS TO VICTORY* SCORECARD

In their work, *Paths to Victory*, Christopher Paul et al. conducted case studies of 71 insurgencies from 1944 to 2010.⁷⁵ Through analysis, expanding on the original work, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, the authors reviewed the multiple variables affecting each insurgency.⁷⁶ During this process, they effectively reduced the complexities found in every insurgency down to 26 relevant factors.⁷⁷ They further reduced these factors to 15 positive factors and 11 negative factors, defining the positive factors as good COIN practices, and the 11 negative factors as bad COIN practices.⁷⁸ When applied, as the Settlement Scorecard, the 26 factors successfully determine, for all 71 cases, the winners/losers of each conflict, and which conflicts end in a negotiated settlement.⁷⁹ The factors then, broadly represent the relevant principles that a COIN force must address during the life-cycle of a counterinsurgency campaign. Figure 2, Scorecard from *Paths to Victory*, shows the original scorecard used by Doctor Paul and his colleagues to score the 71 cases.

⁷⁵ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 13.

⁷⁶ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010).

⁷⁷ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 141–142.

⁷⁸ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 141–142.

⁷⁹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 18–20.

Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors

Good Factors	A	B	C
1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors (Score 1 if sum of a through e is at least 2)			
a. COIN force and government actions consistent with messages (delivering on promises) (Score 1 if YES)			
b. COIN force maintains credibility with population in the area of conflict (includes expectation management) (Score 1 if YES)			
c. Messages/themes coherent with overall COIN approach (Score 1 if YES)			
d. COIN force avoids creating unattainable expectations (Score 1 if YES)			
e. Themes and messages coordinated for all involved government agencies (Score 1 if YES)			
2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors (Score 1 if sum of a through j is at least 3)			
a. Flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased, remains dramatically reduced, or largely absent (Score 1 if YES)			
b. Important external support to insurgents significantly reduced (Score 1 if YES)			
c. Important internal support to insurgents significantly reduced (Score 1 if YES)			
d. Insurgents' ability to replenish resources significantly diminished (Score 1 if YES)			
e. Insurgents unable to maintain or grow force size (Score 1 if YES)			
f. COIN force efforts resulting in increased costs for insurgent processes (Score 1 if YES)			
g. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent recruiting (Score 1 if YES)			
h. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent materiel acquisition (Score 1 if YES)			
i. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent intelligence (Score 1 if YES)			
j. COIN forces effectively disrupt insurgent financing (Score 1 if YES)			
3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor (Score 1 if sum of a and b is at least 1)			
a. Government leaders selected in a manner considered just and fair by majority of population in area of conflict (Score 1 if YES)			
b. Majority of citizens in the area of conflict view government as legitimate (Score 1 if YES)			

Good Factors—Continued	A	B	C
4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict (Score 1 if YES)			
5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor (Score 1 if sum of a and b is at least 1)			
a. Intelligence adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on COIN force's terms (Score 1 if YES)			
b. Intelligence adequate to allow COIN force to disrupt insurgent processes or operations (Score 1 if YES)			
6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas (Score 1 if YES)			
7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained (Score 1 if YES)			
8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force (Score 1 if YES)			
9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict (Score 1 if YES)			
10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force (Score 1 if YES)			
11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces (Score 1 if YES)			
12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas (Score 1 if YES)			
13. Government/COIN force reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline (Score 1 if YES)			
14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control (Score 1 if YES)			
15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control (Score 1 if YES)			
Total positive score (Sum of 1–15)			

Bad Factors	A	B	C
1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression (Score 1 if sum of a and b is at least 1)			
a. COIN force employs escalating repression (Score 1 if YES)			
b. COIN force employs collective punishment (Score 1 if YES)			
2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule (Score 1 if YES)			
3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict (Score 1 if YES)			
4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents (Score 1 if YES)			
5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters (Score 1 if YES)			
6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents (Score 1 if YES)			
7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics (Score 1 if YES)			
8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents (Score 1 if YES)			
9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated (Score 1 if YES)			
10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment (Score 1 if YES)			
11. COIN force and government have different goals/level of commitment (Score 1 if YES)			
Total negative score (Sum of 1–11)			
Final score (Good minus Bad)			

Key:
Total > 1 = History says, "You are on the path to victory."
Total < 0 = History says, "You are in trouble."

Figure 2. Scorecard from *Paths to Victory*.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Source: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–272.

E. *PATHS TO VICTORY SCORECARD EXPLAINED*

The scorecard provides a simple and effective means to score a conflict. Scoring occurs on a binary scale. In terms of the 26 factors, if a factor is present within the assessed area, it scores a 1; if absent, a 0.⁸¹ Naturally, the pervasive presence of several factors may be controversial, and assessors will not agree. If there is significant disagreement in expert analysis of the data, the assessors score the factor as 0.5.⁸² The cumulative negative points are then subtracted from the cumulative positive points to get the final score for the insurgency. Given the number of positive and negative factors, scores can range from +15 to -11. For context, the average score for a COIN force to win is +8, and the average score for an insurgent win is -4.5; the lowest score for a COIN force win is +2, and the highest score for an insurgent win is -1.⁸³ Additionally, the length of time a COIN force maintains certain factors contributes to the durability of the COIN force win.⁸⁴

F. *INITIAL ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR SOJTF-A*

The McCormick Model and the COIN Scorecard were then overlaid together to form the assessment tool, as seen in Figure 3. The applied research team placed each of the 26 factors into where they thought they fit into McCormick's Diamond Model. In doing so, the tool indicates that many of the factors occur in multiple phases of McCormick's Model, presenting the challenges associated with counterinsurgency efforts and sequencing. Each factor's location within the assessment tool was discussed, but the majority of the effort centered on the assessment of the conflict in Afghanistan, rather than focusing on the location of each of the 26 factors.

⁸¹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 194

⁸² Paul et al., *Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II*, 6.

⁸³ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 142.

⁸⁴ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 164–165

Professor McCormick's Diamond Model					
Chris Paul's 26 Practices (15 Positive / 11 Negative)	1. Secure the Population	2. Disconnect Population and Insurgents	3. Target Insurgents	4. Disconnect Insurgents from External Support	5. Target External Support
	1. [ANDSF] realizes at least 2 strategic communication factors				
	2. [ANDSF] reduces at least 3 tangible support factors				
	3. [GIRoA] realizes at least 1 government legitimacy factors				
	4. [GIRoA] corruption reduced/good governance increased since the onset of the conflict				
	5. [ANDSF] force realizes at least one intelligence factor				
	7. Unity of effort/unity of command [was] maintained				
	8. [ANDSF] force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force				
	6. [ANDSF] force of sufficient strength to force [enemy] to fight as guerrillas				
	14. [ANDSF] force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control				
	12. [ANDSF] force establishes and then expands secure areas				
	9. [ANDSF] force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with the population in area of conflict				
	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by [the ANDSF] force				
	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas [that the ANDSF] force claims to control				
	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors [ANDSF] forces				
	13. [GIRoA/ANDSF] reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline				
	1. [ANDSF] force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression				
	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule				
	3. [Host-nation] elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict				
	4. [As] external professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of [the enemy]				
	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters				
	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the [enemy]				
	7. [ANDSF] force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics				
	8. [ANDSF] force engages in more coercion/intimidation than the [enemy]				
	9. [Enemy] force individually superior to [ANDSF] force by being either more professional or better motivated				
	10. [ANDSF] force or [its] allies rely on looting for sustenance				
	11. [ANDSF] force and [GIRoA] have different goals/levels of commitment				

Figure 3. Initial Assessment Tool for SOJTF-A⁸⁵

G. PROOF OF CONCEPT OF THE ASSESSMENT TOOL

Since the applied research supported command requirements, the majority of effort centered on gathering information to score Afghanistan at the national level using the COIN Scorecard as a proof of concept to demonstrate the efficacy of the assessment tool. Students relied on different information for assessment than what the RAND Corporation used for its national scoring for Afghanistan in 2013 and 2015.⁸⁶ The students researched and collected data from multiple sources, including the Asia Study Foundation, Brookings

⁸⁵ Adapted from: Hy Rothstein and Michael Richardson, "Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan" (Applied Research for Commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force [Afghanistan], November 27, 2018); Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–72; McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

⁸⁶ Paul et al., *Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II*, 6–8; Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke, *Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), 29–31.

Institute, SIGARs, and RAND. There were gaps in the literature when attempting to score the 26 factors because many of the previously established systems used to collect the data in Afghanistan no longer existed for the type of data required. For these gaps, the students attempted to use available quantitative data. When the quantitative data was unavailable, students used qualitative data based on knowledge, multiple years of combat experience in the country, and academic understanding of the current situation in Afghanistan. The students researched in 2018, using the 2017 Afghanistan data.

Upon collection and synthesis of the data, the students conducting the applied research scored the condition of Afghanistan in 2017 at the national level using the same methodology as the *Paths to Victory* settlement scorecard. The National Level Assessment produced an overall score of -0.5, which given the previous explanation of the settlement scorecard, the Taliban, and not the COIN force is winning.⁸⁷ Furthermore, with a negative score, if the United States were to enter into a national level negotiation with the Taliban, it would be expected the United States would have to make significant concessions to achieve a settlement.

This analysis, when briefed to the Commander, SOJTF-A recommended that to achieve peaceful resolution and settlement at the national level, the United States must be willing to make concessions to the Taliban, given the score. Further, the research team believed that when compared to the state of the conflict at the time of the brief, the assessment tool proved its efficacy and validity as a means of assessing conditions in Afghanistan using unclassified, open-source data. Figure 4 identifies how Afghanistan at the national level, using 2017 data, was scored against the 26 factors from *Paths to Victory*.

⁸⁷ Rothstein and Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan.”




Figure 4. 2018 NPS National Level Assessment (Afghanistan)⁸⁸

H. REFINING THE ASSESSMENT TOOL INTO ITS PRESENT FORM

Upon completion of the initial scoring using the assessment tool, the NPS team identified a limitation. Where each of the factors, with their score, fell into McCormick's Model was not apparent to the audience, given the initial overlay provided in Figure 3. Practically speaking, the time available forced the applied research team to spend a majority of its energy scoring the conflict in Afghanistan at the national level to provide an assessment and recommendation to the Commander, SOJTF-A. To remedy this, the students devoted significant time during the latter portion of the six-month development

⁸⁸ Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson "Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan."; Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–72.

process to determine the most objective and complete way to determine where the 26 factors fit into McCormick's Model.

During this period of refinement, the research team grounded its approach in the fundamental argument made by Professor McCormick. He argues that a counterinsurgent force must execute each of the five phases in sequence, and to successfully proceed through the five phases, conditions in previous phases must be wholly satisfied.⁸⁹ That is to say, in order to successfully target insurgents, a COIN force must completely secure the population and separate the population from the insurgents. Holding to McCormick's Theory, the team determined that the most appropriate way to place the 26 factors was to use the premise as the baseline condition. Therefore, the team evaluated and placed each of the 26 factors where they are most logically to begin.⁹⁰ That way, the location and sequence of the factors hold the premise made by Professor McCormick. The literature review on insurgent patterns and principles serves as an azimuth check on where each of the 26 factors of the COIN scorecard fell into McCormick's model. The output of this process created a new model that more prominently fills the gap and reduces the limitation of the assessment tool. In its new form, the hybrid model provides a first glance at understanding how the key elements of a COIN campaign should be sequenced from pre-campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term attainment of national objectives. Figure 5 shows the new model.

⁸⁹ McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

⁹⁰ Rothstein and Richardson, "Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan."

HYBRID MODEL	
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors
Good Factors	
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control
Bad Factors	
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment

Figure 5. Hybrid Model⁹¹

I. WHAT THE NEW MODEL SAYS

In its genesis, the new model creates an outline of an answer to the research question: How should the key elements of a COIN campaign be sequenced from pre-campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term attainment of national objectives? Since the method from *Paths to Victory* accurately classified the outcomes of the cases it evaluated, it is logical to assume that affecting the 26 factors in the order presented against McCormick's Model will yield similar results, as

⁹¹ Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson, "Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan"; Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–72; McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

they relate to long-term attainment of United States national objectives in future cases. By inserting the data from the previous model into the new one, the students conducting the applied research could better interpret the reasons why the current campaign in Afghanistan was yielding the observed results. Figure 6 depicts the information researched on behalf of the SOJTF-A Command, and presents it in a new model to more thoroughly and objectively provide answers to the operational requirements.

HYBRID MODEL		
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	YEAR (2018)
Good Factors		
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0.5
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0.5
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0.5
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0.5
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0
Bad Factors		
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0.5
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	1
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL ASSESSMENT SCORE (2018 SCORE USING 2017 DATA)		-0.5

Figure 6. Hybrid Model with 2018 NPS National Level Assessment⁹²

⁹² Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson, “Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan”; Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

J. HOW TO TEST IF THE SEQUENCE IS VALID

While both McCormick's Model and the COIN Scorecard may be valid, their validity does not prove the new model's validity. The new model, at present, provides no way to prove new data points it presents. These data points include that over 60% of all COIN activity (16/26 factors) occurs before ever prioritizing targeting insurgents, the third step of McCormick's Model. Next, over 90% of the factors (24/26) occur in the first three phases, meaning that the two remaining factors should be of relatively little importance. While these are interesting data points, the primary purpose of this study is to use the model to evaluate previously collected case data, develop hypotheses, and test those hypotheses against the field. Accomplishing all 26 factors from *Paths to Victory* will certainly yield COIN success. What is critical is using this concept to determine what key elements a COIN force should prioritize during a campaign. The most objective way to test the model's validity is to take an otherwise vertical model and expand it temporally. The temporal analysis shows how conflicts change throughout their life cycle. If during their life cycle, specific factors significantly impact the conflict, the temporal analysis should identify them. Replicating this test across multiple insurgencies may provide evidence to support the claim that a counterinsurgency campaign can be objectively sequenced, regardless of the conflict.

K. EXPANDING THE ANALYSIS TEMPORALLY

During the assessment phase of each conflict in *Paths to Victory*, Paul et al. scored each conflict at what they determined to be the decisive phase for each of the 71 cases.⁹³ The 2018 National Level Assessment in Figure 6. is scored the same way. By comparing the score from 2018 to previous scores from 2013 and 2015 Afghanistan, provided by the RAND Corporation, the data creates a temporal display of the conflict over five years (2013–2017).⁹⁴ The approach analyzes the conflict in Afghanistan over five years to develop a series of hypotheses about the sequencing of key elements of a

⁹³ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, xxv.

⁹⁴ Paul et al., *Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II*, 6–8; Paul and Clarke, *Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update*, 29–31.

counterinsurgency campaign to test against the field of the cases. Replicating this same process by inserting all the phase case data (204 phases from 71 insurgencies) from *Paths to Victory*, into the new model provides a means of comparing an ongoing conflict against previous conflicts, whose scores are accurate, validating or invalidating the subsequent hypotheses. Below in Figure 7, the new model displays the data for Afghanistan temporally, serving as the foundation for this study's method. Specifically, it shows the national level scores for each of the 26 factors with a combined score at the bottom.

HYBRID MODEL				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	2013	2015	2018
Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	1	0.5
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	1	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0.5	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	1	0.5	0.5
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	1	1	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	1	1	0.5
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	0.5	0.5
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0.5	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0.5	1	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0.5	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0.5	0	0
Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0	0	0.5
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	1	1	1
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0.5	0.5	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment	0.5	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		2	2	-0.5

Figure 7. New Model with Afghanistan Temporal Data.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson, "Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan"; Paul et al., *Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II*, 6–8; Paul and Clarke, *Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update*, 29–31.

IV. ANALYZE DATA AND DEVELOP HYPOTHESES

A. OVERVIEW

A researcher unfamiliar with either McCormick's Theoretical Diamond Model or with the COIN Scorecard from *Paths to Victory* might find the model complex given the five columns and 27 rows of information, including the overall national scores. The three national-level scores from Afghanistan have undergone a simple layer of analysis to simplify the model, and are color-coded to identify the pattern the analysis reveals. The analysis is categorized into three categories (green, blue, and red). Rows colored green indicate that the COIN force positively impacted the factor over the time or phases. Rows colored blue indicate that the COIN force has regressed in its' effectiveness over the phases. Rows colored red indicate that the COIN force has either neglected the factor or been unable to effect it all together. Color coding succeeds in simplifying the model and highlights factors to show the COIN force's performance, however positive or negative, in each factor. The association with several steps within McCormick's Model generally illustrates where that action should have occurred. With McCormick's Model as a starting point, it is then possible to simultaneously analyze the performance of the COIN force against a sequence to develop hypotheses to address the research question of this study. Once developed, the hypotheses can be tested against the 71 other cases from *Paths to Victory*, thereby validating or invalidating the hypothesis. This chapter develops four hypotheses for COIN campaign sequencing to test against 28 cases from *Paths to Victory* by using the data analyzed from the three national-level assessments presented in Figure 8.

HYBRID MODEL				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	2013	2015	2018
Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	1	0.5
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	1	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0.5	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	1	0.5	0.5
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	1	1	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	1	1	0.5
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	0.5	0.5
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0.5	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0.5	1	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0.5	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0.5	0	0
Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0	0	0.5
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	1	1	1
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0.5	0.5	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0.5	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		2	2	-0.5

Figure 8. Afghanistan Temporal Data with Color-Coded Analysis⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Adapted from: Rothstein and Richardson, "Special Topics in Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan" Christopher Paul et al., *Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II*, 6–8; Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke, *Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update*, 29–31; Gordon McCormick, "Guerrilla Warfare."

B. OBSERVATIONS DRAWN FROM ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL

Observation 1. The COIN force has been effective in defeating insurgent forces in direct military engagement, even with the reduction in troops from the NATO mission since 2014.

Observation 2. Three of the four Bad COIN practices neglected by the COIN force have no association with tactical offensive military activity.

Observation 3. Seventy-Five Percent (12/16) factors falling in the first two steps of McCormick's Diamond Model have either been neglected or regressed.

Observation 4. No quantifiable diplomatic or economic progress has been made at the national level, given the inability for GIROA to exercise governance at the national level.

Observation 5. At no point in time has the COIN force adequately achieved any form of strategic communication to reach the entire population of the country.

Observation 6. Unity of Command and Effort and Levels of Commitment by the COIN force and government do not match throughout the period.

C. HYPOTHESES

Hypotheses 1: Given observations one through four, COIN campaigns that prioritize appropriate and suitable governmental, diplomatic, and economic efforts over military efforts early in the campaign achieve their intended objectives over COIN campaigns that do not.

Hypothesis 2: Given observation five, COIN campaigns that realize strategic communication factors early in the campaigns achieve their desired objectives over COIN campaigns that do not.

Hypothesis 3: Given observations one and three, tactical military superiority against an insurgent force, while required throughout the conflict, does not translate to success in a COIN campaign.

Hypothesis 4: Given observations five and six, a shared vision and unity of purpose early in a COIN campaign enables a campaign to be successful over those that do not. Those that do not maintain these two factors fail.

V. COMPARE DATA TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH

A. OVERVIEW

This section compares the Afghanistan Case Study to the 28 Cases of External Actor-Supported Counterinsurgencies from *Paths to Victory*, intending to validate or invalidate each of the four hypotheses developed during the previous chapter.⁹⁷ By assigning factors from the COIN Scorecard in *Paths to Victory* to each of the four hypotheses, this section calculates the success and failure rates of the factors evaluated from the cases. The success and failure rates for each of these hypotheses will determine whether or not the factors are indeed key in external actor supported conflicts. Further, when evaluated against the phase data, this study argues that the successful COIN conflicts will reveal that counterinsurgency campaigns realized the factors in the order supported by each factor's assignment to one of the five phases of McCormick's Model. Therefore, those factors assigned to the first phase of McCormick's Model occurred earlier than those assigned to the later phases in COIN wins. Determining this will be done by observing, in COIN wins, the order each factor occurred. Ideally, each factor will occur in the same phase for each conflict, thereby proving that key elements must occur in a particular order to yield the desired results. If accurate, this study would provide evidence supporting an objective way for the United States to sequence future counterinsurgency efforts.

B. INSERTING THE CASES INTO THE MODEL

To effectively compare the data by category, this study inserts the identified cases with their phase data into the model developed in Chapter III.⁹⁸ The same level of analysis using the color-coded system is applied to each case to support the comparison for both the key elements and the sequencing portions against the Afghanistan data. They are in the

⁹⁷ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77–78.

⁹⁸ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 204–6.

Appendix: 28 Cases of External Actor-Support Counterinsurgencies.⁹⁹ These serve as a reference when interpreting the data that comes out in this chapter.

C. ASSIGNING FACTORS TO HYPOTHESES

Determining which factors from the COIN Scorecard to assign to each hypothesis is the first step in the validation/invalidation process. Factors are assigned to each hypothesis based on the direct impact they would have on the hypothesis itself. In some cases, only one factor is assigned to a hypothesis; in others, multiple factors are assigned based upon the broader scope of the hypothesis. Two of the hypotheses have multiple combinations of factors assigned to them, given the possibility that many factors within the COIN scorecard could equally impact the hypotheses. Every factor that supports a hypothesis is drawn from the analysis conducted on the conflict in Afghanistan, thus using the ongoing conflict as a litmus to test counterinsurgency principles and sequencing against the historical cases. Figure 9: Hypotheses and Assigned Factors, shows how the factors from the COIN Scorecard have been assigned to each of the hypotheses. McCormick's Model indicates when in a counterinsurgency campaign, the hypothesis is most relevant. To explain, Combination A shows that three factors (4,10,14), when simultaneously achieved early in a COIN campaign address Hypothesis 1, which stated, COIN campaigns that prioritize appropriate and suitable governmental, diplomatic, and economic efforts over military efforts early in the campaign achieve their intended objectives over COIN campaigns that do not. Every subsequent combination can be read the same way. The purpose of Figure 9 is to organize the hypotheses and the components of the hybrid model into combinations for faster interpretation of the data. For Hypothesis 1 there are three combinations of factors drawn from the Afghanistan data: A, B, C. Hypothesis 2 has only one factor assigned and is identified as Combination D. Hypothesis 3 has two combinations of factors assigned to it identified as Combinations E and F. Hypothesis 4 has only one series of factors assigned to it identified and Combination G. Assigning multiple combinations of factors to the broader hypotheses provides multiple views on COIN

⁹⁹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77–78.

practices in an effort to determine if there is something indeed unique about COIN campaigns that receive external support or to understand if certain factors are more important than others in this type of COIN environment.

Hypothesis	McCormick's Model	COIN Scorecard Factors Reviewed	Combination
1	1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	A
	2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	
	2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	
	1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	B
	1	2. Government involves corrupt and apersonalistic rule	
	2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	C
	2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	
	2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	
2	2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	D
3	4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	E
	3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	
	3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	
	3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	F
	1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	
	3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	
4	3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	G
	1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	

Figure 9. Hypotheses and Assigned Factors¹⁰⁰

D. WHERE THE FACTORS FALL IN MCCORMICK'S MODEL

This study identified 13 factors in Figure 9 that are most relevant to the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. Twelve of the COIN practices fall within the first three steps of McCormick's Model, with one falling in step four. The outlier is associated with

¹⁰⁰ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–72; Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

Hypothesis 3 and addresses the COIN force's ability to reduce tangible support, which can either be provided internally or come from an external source such as a state sponsor.¹⁰¹ In the case of Afghanistan, it is common knowledge that Pakistan has provided both sanctuary and support to the Taliban during the conflict. For this reason, tangible support must include external support, not just internal support, therefore extending the factor into the fourth step of McCormick's Model. However, aside from the one outlier, the remaining twelve factors fall into the earlier steps of McCormick's Model. The location of the factors is noteworthy because the COIN force has either failed to achieve success in these factors or regressed over the five years. It is the first evidence suggesting there can be a way to sequence the elements of a COIN campaign, given the overall declining trend of the conflict in Afghanistan identified in the temporal analysis in Chapter III.

E. INTERPRETING THE DATA

The following table quantifies the historical results from the information consolidated in Figure 9. The table identifies each combination of factors, determines the frequency of the factors being present both present and absent in the 28 cases, and provides a success and failure rate for the factors based on these conditions. The table shows that for Combination A, out of the 28 cases evaluated, the combination of factors occurred in only six of the cases, and when it did, it yielded a success rate of 83%. When the three factors were simultaneously absent, it occurred 21 times, yielding a COIN failure rate of 62%. The table indicates the challenges of realizing certain factors in counterinsurgency, but show that when realized the success rate significantly increases.

¹⁰¹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 131.

Table 1. 28 Cases Tested against the Hypotheses¹⁰²

Combination	28 Cases w/ External Support (Factors Present)		28 Cases w/ External Support (Factors Absent)	
	Frequency	Success Rate	Frequency	Failure Rate
A	6	83%	21	62%
B	Frequency	Success Rate	Frequency	Failure Rate
	7	86%	13	62%
C	Frequency	Success Rate	Frequency	Failure Rate
	7	100%	21	67%
D	Frequency	Success Rate	Frequency	Failure Rate
	7	86%	28	50%
E	Frequency	Success Rate	Frequency	Failure Rate
	14	79%	16	63%
F	Frequency	Success Rate	Frequency	Failure Rate
	14	93%	8	88%
G	Frequency	Success Rate	Frequency	Failure Rate
	15	80%	17	59%
Succeeded			Failed	
87%			64%	

F. RESULTS FROM THE COMPARISON

Table 1, 28 Cases of External Actor-Support Counterinsurgencies, shows the success and failure rates of counterinsurgencies where the COIN force received varying levels of support from an external actor. Historically, the average COIN win rate was 50%,

¹⁰² Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 252–268.

with the average COIN loss rate at 50%.¹⁰³ Of the 28 cases, 14 resulted in a COIN win, while the other 14 resulted in a COIN loss. Notably, the frequency of factors indicating military-based support was much higher than the frequency of factors expressing diplomatic and economic areas of emphasis, which was considerably lower. However, the aggregate of realizing all 13 factors resulted in an 87% success rate. When they were absent, the failure rate reached 64%. Arguably, using the data set provided by *Paths to Victory* allows the study to validate all four hypotheses developed from the observations made by modeling the conflict in Afghanistan. However, since the frequency of occurrence of each combination of factors is low, a counterargument to this validation is that there is not a sufficient data set to validate or invalidate the hypotheses. This study acknowledges that there is no way to achieve a data saturation level to validate or invalidate the hypotheses completely. However, the counterargument, while acknowledged, does not negate the evidence drawn from the historical cases.

G. DETERMINING IF THE 13 FACTORS OCCURRED IN SEQUENCE

Evaluating the fourteen COIN wins by phase provides a way to determine if a historical sequence occurred. This section uses the same thirteen COIN factors previously identified from the hypotheses to determine if a sequence was standard across external actor-supported counterinsurgency victories. The following three tables display the fourteen conflicts by the phases reported in *Paths to Victory*.¹⁰⁴ Each table builds on the previous, where the first table displays only phase one of each conflict, while the second table displays phases one and two of the conflicts, and if applicable, the third table displays phases one, two and three. Not all of the conflicts have three phases of analysis, but for the study, the progression of counterinsurgency sequencing can still be evaluated given this limitation. In the table, the thirteen factors utilized to develop the hypothesis are displayed, showing the score given in *Paths to Victory* to each phase.¹⁰⁵ If the corresponding block is green, it means the COIN force successfully addressed that factor during that phase. If it

¹⁰³ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77–78.

¹⁰⁴ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 16.

¹⁰⁵ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 252–68.

is red, the COIN force did not succeed in addressing that factor during that phase. As tables introduce subsequent phases, the fourteen counterinsurgencies should address the thirteen factors in a similar order, given the observations and hypotheses. If the conflicts progressed the same way, then the tables should show patterns in how successful counterinsurgencies sequenced their actions.

Table 2, Phase I of the 14 Cases is the first table presented. From the table, the two most common factors successfully addressed by these victorious COIN forces were Bad Factor 2: “Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule,” and Bad Factor 11: “COIN force and government have different goals/level of commitment.”¹⁰⁶ Meaning that most commonly, the counterinsurgent force was able to reduce government corruption and maintain the unity of effort and commitment to resolving the conflict. While there are instances of the COIN forces not achieving these factors, it does occur in the majority of the cases.

Table 2. Phase I of the 14 Cases¹⁰⁷

Bad Factor 2: Government
Involves corrupt and
personalistic rule

Bad Factor 11: COIN force and
government have different
goals/levels of commitment

Evaluating External Actor Supported Counterinsurgencies by Phase														
Conflict: Phase I	1	2	4	6	7	10	12	13	14	B2	B6	B7	B11	
Greek Civil War Phase I	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Philippines Huk Rebellion Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Malaya Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Tibet Phase I	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Oman Phase I	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Guatemala Phase I	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Oman Dhofar Rebellion Phase I	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Angola (UNITA) Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Western Sahara Phase I	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Mozambique (RENAMO) Phase I	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
El Salvador Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
Sierra Leone Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Croatia Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

¹⁰⁶ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 272.

¹⁰⁷ Source: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 252–58.

From Table 3, Phases I-II of the 14 Cases, come two key observations. The first observation is that COIN forces continued to maintain success in Bad Factor 2 and Bad Factor 11 from Phase I. The second observation is that the three factors showing the most improvement from Phase I to Phase II are Good Factor 2: “COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors,” Good Factor 6: “COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas,” and Bad Factor 7: “COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics.”¹⁰⁸ When combined, the COIN force, historically saw their most gains in the COIN force’s ability to militarily counter the insurgent force, while maintaining a reduction in corruption and commitment to conflict resolution.

Table 4 presents Phases I-III of the 14 Cases. From this table, come two further observations. The first observation is that the COIN force generally continues to maintain success in the areas from the previous phases. The second is that while there are gains made by the COIN force, there is no one or any set of factors that stand out across the field. That is to say that each COIN force achieved success, albeit in different areas than other conflicts in the same category. Based on the available data, beyond the early gains made by the COIN forces, of the thirteen evaluated factors, the data do not show one specific sequence or overall approach that ultimately resulted in COIN victories. The table displays that beyond the initial gains made in similar areas, COIN forces achieved success in a variety of different ways as the conflicts matured, resulting in the COIN force victories.

¹⁰⁸ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–72.

Table 3. Phases I-II of the 14 Cases¹⁰⁹

Good Factor 6: COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerillas

Bad Factor 2: Government Involves corrupt and personalistic rule

Bad Factor 11: COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment

Conflict: Phases I-II	1	2	4	6	7	10	12	13	14	B2	B6	B7	B11
Greek Civil War Phase I	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Greek Civil War Phase II	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Philippines Huk Rebellion Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Philippines Huk Rebellion Phase II	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
Malaya Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
Malaya Phase II	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Tibet Phase I	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Tibet Phase II	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Oman Phase I	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Oman Phase II	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala Phase I	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Guatemala Phase II	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Oman Dhofar Rebellion Phase I	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Oman Dhofar Rebellion Phase II	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Angola (UNITA) Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Angola (UNITA) Phase II	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Western Sahara Phase I	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
Western Sahara Phase II	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Mozambique (RENAMO) Phase I	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Mozambique (RENAMO) Phase II	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Sri Lanka Phase II	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
El Salvador Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
El Salvador Phase II	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
Sierra Leone Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Sierra Leone Phase II	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Croatia Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Croatia Phase II	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

¹⁰⁹ Source: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 252–68.

Table 4. Phases I-III of the 14 Cases.¹¹⁰

Evaluating External Actor-Supported Counterinsurgencies by Phase															
Conflict: Phases I-III	1	2	4	6	7	10	12	13	14	82	86	87	811		
Greek Civil War Phase I	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0		
Greek Civil War Phase II	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1		
Greek Civil War Phase III	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0		
Philippines Huk Rebellion Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1		
Philippines Huk Rebellion Phase II	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1		
Philippines Huk Rebellion Phase III	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		
Malaya Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0		
Malaya Phase II	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0		
Malaya Phase III	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0		
Tibet Phase I	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0		
Tibet Phase II	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0		
Tibet Phase III	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0		
Oman Phase I	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0		
Oman Phase II	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Guatemala Phase I	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		
Guatemala Phase II	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Guatemala Phase III	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1		
Oman Dhofar Rebellion Phase I	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		
Oman Dhofar Rebellion Phase II	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0		
Oman Dhofar Rebellion Phase III	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		
Angola (UNITA) Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Angola (UNITA) Phase II	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1		
Angola (UNITA) Phase III	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0		
Western Sahara Phase I	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0		
Western Sahara Phase II	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
Western Sahara Phase III	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Mozambique (RENAMO) Phase I	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		
Mozambique (RENAMO) Phase II	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0		
Sri Lanka Phase I	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		
Sri Lanka Phase II	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1		
Sri Lanka Phase III	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1		
El Salvador Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1		
El Salvador Phase II	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0		
El Salvador Phase III	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1		
Sierra Leone Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1		
Sierra Leone Phase II	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1		
Sierra Leone Phase III	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		
Croatia Phase I	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0		
Croatia Phase II	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0		

¹¹⁰ Source: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 252–58.

H. WHAT WAS NOT OBSERVED

When evaluating the cases by phase, there is one distinct observation deserving identification and description. It is where the COIN force did not make any noticeable gain against the insurgency in the conflict. The lack of any success, or later success corresponds most noticeably to Good Factor 1: “COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors.”¹¹¹ Overall, in COIN victories, it was the least affected, or the latest affected of the thirteen factors analyzed in this section.

I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This chapter conducted two forms of analysis to evaluate data to validate/invalidate the four hypotheses developed from the conflict in Afghanistan. The first section sought to determine the key elements of counterinsurgency while the second looked to determine if they occurred in sequence. When evaluating the key elements of counterinsurgency, the analysis showed that, when achieved in various combinations, the factors chosen yielded an 87% success rate in historical conflicts. In the second analysis, these same factors, when evaluated by phase, showed that while there were instances of factors occurring early in phases in most conflicts, most conflicts followed different paths when compared to the evaluated field. Finally, evaluating the conflicts by phase also highlighted what was not achieved by the COIN force. In all, these findings, both key elements and observation of sequence provide the information needed to revisit the hypotheses to determine their validity when attempting to answer the research question. The final chapter analyzes the findings.

¹¹¹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270.

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VI. ANALYZE FINDINGS AND DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OVERVIEW

This study set out with the goal of understanding the options for sequencing key elements of counterinsurgency from inception to completion for future applications to ensure the attainment of U.S. national objectives. The effort began for two reasons. The first was to provide insight of the concepts available to the Department of State and the Department of Defense to prevent the United States from again finding itself in an endless war without realization of the national objectives the engagement intended to achieve in the first place. The second was to determine if there is a way to arrange these concepts that can serve as a guideline during future diplomatic and military commitment in counterinsurgency environments. The origins of the study began much earlier when students of the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School executed applied research on behalf of Special Operations Joint Task Force—Afghanistan examining the conditions to pursue a negotiated settlement, and how to measure those conditions accurately. During the first iteration of applied research, the team of Naval Postgraduate Students was able to provide an assessment of the then-current state of the conflict in Afghanistan. As the research continued, the requests from the forward headquarters naturally changed as the conflict evolved. The applied research sought to understand why instability and violence, in light of peace talks, continued. The research team used the initial assessment, and coupled with the RAND Corps data, analyzed the conflict in Afghanistan over five years. Here, the team at NPS, using McCormick's Theoretical Model and the COIN Scorecard from *Paths to Victory* as the foundation, believed they were able to explain why national conditions in Afghanistan did not favor the government of Afghanistan / the United States-led NATO mission to negotiate a resolution with Taliban leaders to end the 18-year war.¹¹²

¹¹² Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

The motivation for this study emerged during the analysis of the phases of the conflict in Afghanistan. An observation of the five years highlighted where the government and COIN force failed to address critical components that historically lead to success in counterinsurgencies. Since insurgencies are on the rise, using the war in Afghanistan to identify a specific set of principles of counterinsurgency and try and find the most objective way to sequence these activities seemed viable to answer the research question. By drawing on the war in Afghanistan to develop hypotheses, the study sought to use a present conflict to determine, with the outcome still undecided, an appropriate COIN campaign sequence. By testing the hypotheses against the historic cases provided by *Paths to Victory*, the research may yield information that was previously overlooked or overshadowed by other prevailing belief systems. In the following section, this chapter analyzes the findings and tests the hypotheses against the evidence to determine their validity. From this review, the study will see if the research question's components were satisfied. If so, the study will provide recommendations for counterinsurgency for future applications. If not, it will highlight the areas where future research may more comprehensively address the initial research question. Even if this study falls short of comprehensively answering the research question, at a minimum, it may provide a small first step in the right direction of addressing the gap identified in current U.S. government instruction and doctrine.

B. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Below the four hypotheses are revisited with an analysis of the evidence gathered to determine their validity, addressing both components of the research question.

Hypotheses 1: Given observations one through four, COIN campaigns that prioritize appropriate and suitable governmental, diplomatic, and economic efforts over military efforts early in the campaign achieve their intended objectives over COIN campaigns that do not.

Discussion: Observations from the conflict in Afghanistan identified multiple areas where the counterinsurgent force has failed to address several areas of governmental, diplomatic, and economic improvements within the COIN scorecard. Three combinations of factors showed either neglect or regression by the COIN force over the five years. These

combinations, when achieved in historical conflicts, resulted in significantly higher success rates when compared to the baseline. However, their frequency of occurrence was so low, that achieving them in future conflicts is rather unlikely. So, while they may have been key for their cases, this study showed these combinations were not critical in all conflicts.

Further, when the study analyzed the fourteen COIN victories by phase, there was little similarity in the pattern of these combinations. Evidence showed that only one factor in these three combinations showed any evidence of occurring early in COIN force victories: Bad Factor 2. “Government involves corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.”¹¹³ The remaining factors did not occur until later in the phases, and the evidence does not suggest that prioritizing governmental, diplomatic, and economic efforts over military efforts will necessarily yield a higher success rate.

Hypothesis 2: Given observation five, COIN campaigns that realize strategic communication factors early in the campaigns achieve their desired objectives over COIN campaigns that do not.

Discussion: Observations from the Afghanistan conflict showed the inability of the COIN force to ever achieve strategic communication over the insurgency. One factor, Good Factor 1, explicitly addresses strategic communication and its effects on the outcome of a conflict.¹¹⁴ When achieved in historical cases, the results were significantly higher than the baseline, but again, the frequency was so low that, while it may have been critical for several conflicts, they were not necessary for all conflicts. Of the thirteen factors pulled from the conflict in Afghanistan and used in chapters IV and V of this study, Good Factor 1 was the least and latest addressed factor in all COIN force victories. This study suggests that the reason for this is that the insurgency controls both the information space and the initiative. Professor McCormick, in his five-step model, argues that the insurgency competes against the counterinsurgent force for explicit control of the information space of the population.¹¹⁵ If the argument is valid, then logically, influence and ownership of

¹¹³ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 272.

¹¹⁴ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270.

¹¹⁵ McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

strategic communication would be the least and latest factor to be achieved by the COIN force. For this study, though, evidence shows that the insurgency retains control of the information space, whether or not the COIN force succeeds.

Hypothesis 3: Given observations one and three, tactical military superiority against an insurgent force, while required throughout the conflict, does not translate to success in a COIN campaign.

Discussion: From the conflict in Afghanistan, this study developed two combinations of factors to address hypothesis three. The two combinations both yielded a higher success rate than the historical baseline, and occurred most frequently of all the combinations developed and evaluated. However, while both were higher than the baseline, the other combination of factors, Combination F. showed that when achieved, the historical success rate was 93%. It shared one factor with Combination E., Good Factor 6: “COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas,” but its two differing factors, Good Factor 12: “COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas,” and Bad Factor 7: “COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics,” focus on the COIN force’s effectiveness with respect to the conflict at large, and not solely against the enemy.¹¹⁶ This view shows that while engaging and defeating the insurgents yields success in conflicts, decisive military action should enable non-lethal gains. That is to say that conducting a raid, while useful in eliminating insurgent leaders and materiel may not have the sustained effects of establishing area security over a prolonged period. When evaluated by phases, it is evident that Good Factor 6 is the third earliest achieved factor in the phases of the COIN force victories, while the remaining factors occur later in the phases at about the same frequency.¹¹⁷ Based on the evidence, tactical military superiority is necessary, but from this level of analysis, there was nothing in the data explicitly examining how to employ that military capability. Evidence does show that expanding secure areas while maintaining flexibility to adapt to the insurgent’s

¹¹⁶ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–72.

¹¹⁷ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 271.

strategy yields higher success than reducing tangible enemy support and initiating contact first on the insurgency.¹¹⁸

Hypothesis 4: Given observations five and six, a shared vision and unity of purpose early in a COIN campaign enables a campaign to be successful over those that do not. Those that do not maintain these two factors fail.

Discussion: The conflict in Afghanistan showed that throughout the evaluated period from 2013–2018, that at no time was unity of effort and goals/levels of commitment by the COIN force and government achieved.¹¹⁹ When established as Combination G, the two factors, when achieved, had the highest frequency of occurring together throughout the conflicts compared to all other combinations of factors. Though having the highest percentage of frequency, it also had the second-lowest percentage of increased success rate. Though higher than the 50% baseline, it only increased the rate of success in historical cases to 80%. The data shows that while achieving this combination was more frequent than other combinations, the two factors, while increasing the success rate, do not translate into COIN force success. When evaluating the factors by phase, evidence from the fourteen evaluated cases shows that Bad Factor 11: “COIN force and government have different goals/level of commitment” was achieved in the first phase of 10 of 14 cases.¹²⁰ This factor also continues to persist throughout the phases, similar to Bad Factor 2. However, the evidence does not show that Good Factor 7: “Unity of effort/unity of command maintained” was all that critical to enabling a COIN campaign. It, similar to strategic communication, seemed to occur later in the phases, rather than earlier. Given the two layers of analysis and the historical cases, evidence indicates Bad Factor 11, similar to Bad Factor 2, is critical in achieving early in a COIN campaign, and when maintained, enables the COIN force to make gains in other areas.

¹¹⁸ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 270–272.

¹¹⁹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 271–72.

¹²⁰ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 272.

C. OVERALL FINDINGS

Given the evidence and the discussion of each of the four hypotheses, this study did not find one objective way to sequence counterinsurgency. Furthermore, the study was not able to provide a clearly defined set of counterinsurgency principles that guarantee success. Instead, data showed that in successful External Actor-Supported Counterinsurgencies, three of the thirteen factors were achieved earlier than others, and remained consistent through the life-cycle of the campaign. Arguably, when committing to a counterinsurgency, at minimum, the evidence suggests the United States should focus on realizing these factors and preserving gains, before moving on to other areas. The data also showed that beyond the three factors identified, COIN forces achieve success in a variety of ways. While particular combinations of factors, when achieved together, yielded high COIN win rates, the low frequencies of achieving these combinations suggest that these concepts do not overarchingly apply to all conflicts. However, the combinations provide options for prioritizing factors rather than try to tackle the remaining ten, or even twenty-three factors of the COIN Scorecard simultaneously. Attempting to do that would most certainly overwhelm any staff. Selecting a few factors at a time would reduce the ambiguity of a counterinsurgency strategy and provide focus and direction to subordinate elements. Implementing this approach allows for COIN sequencing to be executed in several sets of a branch and sequel plans as the conflict evolves.

Additionally, with the ability to assess the conditions on the ground using the COIN scorecard, it would be easy to attempt a specific combination of factors, and if failed, adjust to another set until the right combination was found to achieve success in counterinsurgency. Given the analysis of the combination of factors, a planning staff could determine which combination of factors to pursue by making a simple comparison of the frequency of occurrence to success rate to choose the best set of factors to emphasize. The tools in the study, if used, could allow staff to systematically attempt each set of factors and measure any progress or regression, maintaining an objective understanding of the state of the counterinsurgency campaign.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

If history is precedent, in the future, the United States will find itself engaged in counterinsurgency efforts around the world. Given this possibility, the United States needs a way to measure and assess those efforts. The model developed to support Special Operations Joint Task Force—Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) can and should be used as that tool to measure and assess those efforts. The applied research conducted for the Commander, SOJTF-A, validated the efficacy of the tool's ability to accurately determine the status of the conflict. New challenges with the negotiations with the Taliban to bring the conflict in Afghanistan to a resolution is evidence to support the models' findings that conditions did not favor the United States at the negotiating table.¹²¹ While future U.S. policy or grand strategy may force the country into COIN campaigns, the assessment tool can be used to recognize the challenges the Department of State and the Department of Defense will face.

Additionally, using the tool to conduct the assessment allows policy-makers to manage the expectations of what may come from engaging in a counterinsurgency campaign. Executing an assessment of conditions preceding a future conflict, then comparing the data to cases available in *Paths to Victory*, with its 71 cases, provide historical examples that can illuminate the potential challenges the United States government and the host nation may face by committing to a COIN campaign.¹²² Managing expectations forces decision-makers to scope the objectives appropriately they intend the COIN campaign to achieve, thus ensuring at a minimum there is unity of purpose and effort for the United States. Finally, the model should be used as a running estimate to determine what the status of future conflict is at any given time. The United States will always have an idea of how a counterinsurgency campaign is progressing, whether positively or negatively, and at a minimum, the United States government can provide realistic expectations to the American public.

¹²¹ "U.S.-Taliban Talks End without Deal, Both Sides to Consult," *Reuters*, August 12, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-idUSKCN1V206N>.

¹²² Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, iii.

E. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The study illuminated areas where additional future research could provide a more comprehensive understanding of counterinsurgency sequencing. The study only drew on thirteen of the twenty-six factors from the COIN scorecard based on hypotheses created from analysis of the conflict in Afghanistan, yielding an aggregated success rate of 87% in External Actor-Supported Counterinsurgencies.¹²³ While the process showed evidence that certain elements can be key in select situations, there was no one set of factors that yielded a 100% success rate with a 100% frequency rate. In evaluating the thirteen factors by phase, the data showed that beyond the three factors occurring earliest in successes, COIN forces achieved success in numerous ways. Future research should center on creating a model to organize all 26 factors into multiple combinations and test them against the field of the 71 cases to determine if a sequence of certain factors could indeed yield a 100% success rate and a 100% frequency rate in counterinsurgency. Doing so would provide the best information for determining both key elements and a projected sequence.

Also, this study identified a gap in the guidance and doctrine of the DoS and DoD. The findings of the study show that counterinsurgency, with all its complexities, requires multiple stakeholders within the two departments. Future research should focus on developing the appropriate joint interagency headquarters at all necessary levels with supporting staff functions to adequately address the governmental, economic, informational, and military processes and procedures required to succeed in counterinsurgency. Lastly, this study used phased data provided by the authors of *Paths to Victory* to understand how conflicts evolved throughout their life-cycles. Those varied from conflict to conflict based on the COIN forces' efforts to change the status of the conflict.¹²⁴ In order for the assessment tool to benefit decision-makers, further research on conducting assessments using the provided tools would maximize the value gained by planning staff tasked with counterinsurgency efforts. Doing so would stabilize the

¹²³ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77–78.

¹²⁴ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 16.

assessment process to either limit overproduction or prevent the underproduction of data for analysis.

F. CONCLUSION

Evidence indicates insurgency is on the rise, both as a form of conflict and a tool of foreign policy by nations opposing the United States and its interests. There is a gap in the ability of both the Department of State and the Department of Defense, the two stakeholders in the U.S. government responsible for counterinsurgency, to guide planners in sequencing the elements of counterinsurgency to yield long-term attainment of U.S. national objectives. This study generated four hypotheses from the conflict in Afghanistan by overlaying two models together in the methods chapter to compare against historical cases of counterinsurgency. The analysis showed that most successful COIN campaigns achieve success early in three areas, but beyond these three, COIN forces have achieved success in a variety of ways. This study recommends that the United States should focus on achieving success in these three areas before moving on to other areas of the conflict. Once achieved, the United States government and host nation can move onto other areas. The data drawn from the 28 Cases of External Actor-Supported Counterinsurgencies showed multiple combinations of factors that yielded high COIN success rates, which provide options to pursue following the establishment of the previous conditions.¹²⁵ Systematically working through these combinations of factors gives the COIN force a way to apply new concepts to the campaign. Using the model in Chapter III as an assessment tool provides a way to measure progress and failure objectively. With this ability, the United States government and the host nation can adjust the strategy as needed when COIN practices fail. Since the model provides a way to measure progress objectively, the United States government will always know the status conflict, and what has and has not yielded success. While the study does not provide a way to sequence the key elements of a counterinsurgency campaign from pre-campaign conditions through operations to post-campaign stabilization to ensure long-term attainment of national objectives, it does provide a starting point. While this approach may not guarantee success in

¹²⁵ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77–78.

counterinsurgency, applying these recommendations to future conflicts will provide the American public and policy-makers with what the costs paid for in both blood and treasure are yielding in pursuit of attaining desired national objectives.

APPENDIX. TWENTY-EIGHT CASES OF EXTERNAL ACTOR-SUPPORTED COUNTERINSURGENCIES

1. Greece.¹²⁶

Greece 1945-1949 (COIN Win)						
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Dec 1944-Feb 1949)	Phase II (Mar 1945-Feb 1947)	Phase II (Mar 1947-Nov 1949)		
	Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	1	0	1		
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	1		
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	1	1		
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	1	1		
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	0	1		
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1		
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	1	0	1		
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	1	1		
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0		
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0		
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	1	1		
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	1	0	1		
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0		
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	1		
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	1	0	1		
	Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	0	0		
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0		
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0		
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0		
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1		
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1		
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	1	0		
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0		
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	1	0		
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0		
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	1	0		
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		4	0	10		

¹²⁶Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

2. Philippines (Huk Rebellion).¹²⁷

Philippines 1946-1956 [Huk Rebellion] (COIN Win)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Jul 1946-Aug 1949)	Phase II (Sep 1949-Aug 1950)	Phase III (Sep 1950-1956)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	1	
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	1	1	
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	1	
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	1	
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	1	
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1	
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	1	
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	1	
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	1	
2	10. Short-term investments. Improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	1	
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	1	
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	1	
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	1	
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	1	1	1	
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	1	
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0	0	0	
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	0	
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	0	
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	0	0	
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	0	0	
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	1	0	
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	1	1	0	
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	0	
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		-5	-2	15	

¹²⁷ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

3. Malaya.¹²⁸

Malaya 1948-1955 (COIN Win)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Jun 1948-Mar 1950)	Phase II (Apr 1950-Dec 1951)	Phase III (Jan 1952-1955)	
Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	1	1	
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	1	1	
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	1	1	1	
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	1	1	
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	1	1	
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1	
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	1	1	
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	1	1	1	
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	1	1	
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	1	1	
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	1	1	
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	1	1	1	
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	1	1	
Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0	1	0	
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0	
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	1	1	0	
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1	
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1	
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	0	0	
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0	
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	0	0	
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0	
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		0	9	11	

¹²⁸ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

4. Oman (Imamate Uprising).¹²⁹

Oman [Imamate Uprising] 1957-1959 (COIN Win)				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Jul 1957-Jul 1958)	Phase II (Jul 1958-Mar 1959)	
Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	0	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	1	1	1
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	1
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0
Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	0	0
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		-3	3	3

¹²⁹ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

5. Tibet. 130

Tibet 1956-1974 (COIN Win)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1956-Mar 1959)	Phase II (Mar 1959-Aug 1959)	Phase III (Sep 1959-1974)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	1	1	1	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	1	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	1	1	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	1	1	1	1
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	1	1	1
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	1	1	1	1
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0	0
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	0	0	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	1	1	1	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0	0
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	3	4	4	4

130 Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

6. Guatemala.¹³¹

Guatemala 1960-1996 (COIN Win)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1960-1970)	Phase II (1970-1982)	Phase III (1983-1996)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	1	0	0	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	1	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	1	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	0	0	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	1	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	1	1	1	1
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	1	1	1	1
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	1	1	1
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	1	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	1	1	1	1
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	1	1	1	1
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	1	0	0	0
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	0	0	1	0
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	1	1	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	1	1	1
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	12	0	4	

¹³¹ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

7. Laos.¹³²

Laos 1955-1975 (COIN Loss)						
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1959-1962)	Phase II (1962-1968)	Phase III (1968-1973)	Phase IV (1973-1975)	
	Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	1	0	0	1	1
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	0	0	0	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	1	0	0	1	1
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	1	1	1	1	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0	0	0
	Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0	0	0	0	0
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	1	1	1	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	1	1	1	1	1
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	0	0	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	1	0	1	1
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	1	1	1	1
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	1	1
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	-3	-6	-5	-5	-5

¹³² Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

8. South Vietnam.¹³³

South Vietnam 1960-1975 (COIN Loss)						
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1960-1963)	Phase II (1964-Jan 1968)	Phase III (1968-1973)	Phase IV (1973-1975)	
	Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	1	0	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	1	0	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	0	1	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	0	0	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	1	1	1	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	1	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	1	1	1	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0	0	0
	Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	1	1	1	1	1
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	1	1	1	1	1
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	1	1	1	1
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	1	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	1	1	1	1
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	1	1	1	1	1
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	1	1
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		-4	-8	-7	-11	

¹³³ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

9. Eritrea.¹³⁴

Eritrea 1961-1991 (COIN Loss)				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1961-1977)	Phase II (1978-1984)	Phase IV (1985-1991)
Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	1	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	1	1
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	1	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0
Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	1
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		-2	1	-3

¹³⁴ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

10. Yemen.¹³⁵

Yemen 1962-1970 (COIN Loss)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1962-1963)	Phase II (1964-1966)	Phase III (1967-1970)	
Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	1	1	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	1	1	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	1	1	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0	0
Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	1	1	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	1	1	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	1
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR					
		-4	-2	-3	

¹³⁵ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

11. Oman (Dhofar Rebellion).¹³⁶

Oman [Dhofar Rebellion] 1965-1975 (COIN Win)				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1965-1967)	Phase II (1967-1970)	Phase III (1970-1975)
	Good Factors			
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	1
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	1
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	0	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	1	1	1
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	1
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	1
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	1
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	1
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	1
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	1
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	1
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	1
	Bad Factors			
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	1	1
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	0
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	1	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	1	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustainment	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		0	-4	11

¹³⁶ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

12. Cambodia.¹³⁷

Cambodia 1967-1975 (COIN Loss)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1967-1970)	Phase II (1970-1973)	Phase III (Aug 1973-1975)	
Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	1	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	1	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	0	0	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	1	1	1	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	1	0	0	0
Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	1	1	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	1	1	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	0	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	1	1	1
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	1	1	1
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	1
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		3	-8	-7	

¹³⁷ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

13. Angola (UNITA).¹³⁸

Angola [UNITA] 1975-2002 (COIN Win)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1975-1991)	Phase II (1992-1997)	Phase III (1998-2002)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	1	1	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	1	1	1
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	1	1	1
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	1	1	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	0	0	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	1
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	1	1	1	1
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	1	1	1
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	1	1	1
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	1	1	1	1
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	1	1	1	1
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	1	1	1
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	0
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	1	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	0	0	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	0
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	-4	7	10	

¹³⁸ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 77, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

14. Lebanese Civil War.¹³⁹

Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990 (COIN Loss, Mixed - favoring insurgents)				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1975-1981)	Phase II (1982-1990)	
	Good Factors			
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	1	1	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	1	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	1
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	1
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0
	Bad Factors			
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0	0	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	1
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	0	0	0
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	1
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	0		-2

¹³⁹ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

15. Western Sahara.¹⁴⁰

Western Sahara 1975-1991 (COIN Win, Mixed - favoring COIN)				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1975-1982)	Phase II (1983-1988)	Phase II (1988-1991)
	Good Factors			
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	1	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	1	1	1
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	1	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	1	1	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0
	Bad Factors			
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	0
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	0	0
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	0	2	2

¹⁴⁰ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

16. Mozambique (RENAMO).¹⁴¹

Mozambique [RENAMO] 1976-1995 (COIN Win - Mixed, favoring COIN)		Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors		Phase I (1976-1983)	Phase II (1984-1995)
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)		Good Factors			
2		1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors		0	0
4		2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors		1	1
1		3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor		1	1
1		4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict		0	0
3		5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor		1	1
3		6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas		1	1
3		7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained		0	0
3		8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force		0	0
1		9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict		1	1
2		10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force		0	0
1		11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces		0	0
1		12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas		0	1
2		13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline		0	0
2		14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control		1	1
1		15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control		0	1
Bad Factors					
3		1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression		1	1
1		2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule		0	0
1		3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict		0	0
4		4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents		1	0
5		5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters		0	1
3		6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents		0	0
3		7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics		0	0
1		8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents		0	0
2		9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated		0	0
1		10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance		1	1
1		11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment		0	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR				3	5

¹⁴¹ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

17. Sri Lanka.¹⁴²

Sri Lanka 1976-2009 (COIN Win)										
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors					Phase I (1976-1986)	Phase II (1987-1990)	Phase III (1990-Apr 1995)	Phase IV (May 1995-2001)	Phase V (2002-2009)
	Good Factors									
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors					0	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors					0	1	0	0	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor					1	1	1	1	1
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict					0	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor					1	0	0	0	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas					1	1	0	0	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained					0	0	0	0	1
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force					0	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict					0	1	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force					0	1	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces					0	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas					0	1	0	0	0
2	13. Government (COIN reconstruction/development sought) achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline					0	1	0	0	1
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control					0	1	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control					0	0	0	0	0
	Bad Factors									
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression					1	0	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule					0	0	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict					0	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents					0	0	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters					0	0	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents					0	1	1	1	0
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics					1	0	1	1	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents					1	0	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated					1	0	1	1	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance					0	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment					0	1	1	1	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR						-1	6	4	-4	5

¹⁴² Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

18. Nicaragua (Somoza).¹⁴³

Nicaragua [Somoza] 1978-1979(COIN Loss)				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Jan 1978-Mar 1979)	Phase II (Apr 1979-July 1979)	
	Good Factors			
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	0	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0
	Bad Factors			
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	1
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	1
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	-2	-6	

¹⁴³ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

19. Afghanistan (anti-Soviet).¹⁴⁴

Afghanistan [Anti-Soviet] 1978-1992 (COIN Loss)						
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1979-1984)	Phase II (1984-1986)	Phase III (1986-1988)	Phase IV (1989-1992)	
	Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0	0	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0	0	0
	Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	0	1	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	0	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	1	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	0	1	1	1
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	1	1
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		-5	-4	-6	-4	-4

¹⁴⁴ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

20. Kampuchea.¹⁴⁵

Kampuchea 1978-1992 (COIN Loss - Mixed, favoring Insurgents)						
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1979-1981)	Phase II (1981-1983)	Phase III (1984-1985)	Phase IV (1986-1989)	Phase V (1989-1992)
Good Factors						
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	1	0	1	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	1	0	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	1	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	0	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	1	1	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	1	1	1	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	1	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	1	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	1	1	1	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	1	0	1	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	1	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	1	0	0	0	0
Bad Factors						
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	0	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	0	1	0	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	1	1	1	1
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0	0	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR						
		13	0	3	2	-4

¹⁴⁵ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

21. El Salvador.¹⁴⁶

El Salvador 1979-1992 (COIN Win - Mixed, favoring COIN)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1979-1984)	Phase II (1984-1986)	Phase III (1987-1992)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	1	
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	1	1	
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	1	1	
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	1	1	
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	1	1	
	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	1	1	
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	1	1	
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	1	1	
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	1	1	
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	1	1	
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	1	0	
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	1	1	
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	1	1	
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	0	
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	0	0	
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	0	
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0	
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	0	0	
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	0	0	
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	0	1	
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	-6	10	11	

¹⁴⁶ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

22. Liberia.¹⁴⁷

Liberia 1989-1997 (COIN Loss)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Dec 1989-Aug 1990)	Phase II (Sep 1990-Mar 1996)	Phase III (Apr 1996-Jul 1997)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0	1
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	0	0	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	1	0
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	1	1	1
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	1	1	1	1
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	0	0	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	0	0	1
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	1	1	1	1
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	1
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	-7	-6	-8	

¹⁴⁷ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

23. Rwanda.¹⁴⁸

Rwanda 1990-1994 (COIN Loss)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1990)	Phase II (1990-1993)	Phase III (1994)	
Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	1	
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0	
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	1	1	1	
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	1	1	0	
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	1	0	0	
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	1	1	
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	1	1	0	
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force daims to control	0	0	0	
Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	1	
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	0	
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0	
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	1	1	
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	1	
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	1	1	
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		3	0	-3	

¹⁴⁸ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

24. Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁹

Sierra Leone 1991-2002 (COIN Win)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Mar 1991-Apr 1995)	Phase II (May 1995-May 2000)	Phase III (Jun 2000-May 2002)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	1	1
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	1	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	1	1
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	1	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	1	1
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	1	1
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	1	1
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	1	1
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	1	1
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	1	1
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	1	1
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or daims to control	0	0	1	1
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	1	1
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	0	0
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	0	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	1	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	0	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	0	0
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	-5	-5	13	

¹⁴⁹ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

25. Croatia. 150

Croatia 1992-1995 (COIN Win)				
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Jan 1992-Dec 1994)	Phase II (Jan 1995-Aug 1995)	
	Good Factors			
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	1
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	1	1	1
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	0	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments: improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	1	1	1
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	1	1	1
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0
	Bad Factors			
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	0	0	0
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	1	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	0	0	3

150 Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

26. Tajikistan.¹⁵¹

Tajikistan 1992-1997 (COIN Loss - Mixed, favoring Insurgents)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (1992)	Phase II (1993-1996)	Phase III (1997)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	1	1	1
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	1	1	1	1
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0	0
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	0
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	1	1	1	1
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	0	0	0	0
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	0	0	0	0
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	0	0	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0	0
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	1	1	1	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	0	0	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	1	1	1	1
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	1
	NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR	-6	-3	-2	

¹⁵¹ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

27. Nagorno-Karabakh.¹⁵²

Nagorno-Karabakh 199-1995 (COIN Loss - Mixed, favoring Insurgents)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Jan 1992-May 1992)	Phase II (Jun 1992-Nov 1993)	Phase III (Dec 1993-May 1994)	
	Good Factors				
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	0	0	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	0	0	0	1
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0	0
	Bad Factors				
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalistic rule	0	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	1	1	1	1
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1	1
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	0	0	0	1
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	1	1	0
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	0	0	0	0
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		-5	-5	-5	-3

¹⁵² Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

28. Bosnia.¹⁵³

Bosnia 1992-1995 (COIN Loss - Mixed, favoring Insurgents)					
McCormick's Model (Annotated by Phase)	Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	Phase I (Mar 1992-Dec 1992)	Phase II (Jan 1993-Jan 1994)	Phase III (Feb 1994-Dec 1995)	
Good Factors					
2	1. COIN force realizes at least two strategic communication factors	0	0	0	0
4	2. COIN force reduces at least three tangible support factors	0	0	0	0
1	3. Government realizes at least one government legitimacy factor	0	0	0	0
1	4. Government corruption reduced/good governance increased since onset of conflict	0	0	0	0
3	5. COIN force realizes at least one intelligence factor	0	0	0	0
3	6. COIN force of sufficient strength to force insurgents to fight as guerrillas	0	0	0	0
3	7. Unity of effort/unity of command maintained	1	0	0	0
3	8. COIN force avoids excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force	0	0	0	0
1	9. COIN force seeks to engage and establish positive relations with population in area of conflict	0	0	0	0
2	10. Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure/development, or property reform in area of conflict controlled or claimed by COIN force	0	0	0	0
1	11. Majority of population in area of conflict supports/favors COIN forces	0	0	0	0
1	12. COIN force establishes and then expands secure areas	0	0	0	0
2	13. Government/COIN reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements substantially above historical baseline	0	0	0	0
2	14. COIN force provides or ensures provision of basic services in areas it controls or claims to control	0	0	0	0
1	15. Perception of security created or maintained among population in areas COIN force claims to control	0	0	0	0
Bad Factors					
3	1. COIN force uses both collective punishment and escalating repression	1	1	1	1
1	2. Government involves corrupt and personalist crule	0	0	0	0
1	3. Country elites have perverse incentives to continue conflict	0	0	0	0
4	4. External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents	1	1	1	1
5	5. Host nation is economically dependent on external supporters	1	1	1	1
3	6. Fighting primarily initiated by the insurgents	1	1	1	0
3	7. COIN force fails to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics	1	1	1	1
1	8. COIN force engages in more coercion/intimidation than insurgents	0	0	0	0
2	9. Insurgent force individually superior to COIN force by being either more professional or better motivated	1	1	1	1
1	10. COIN force or allies rely on looting for sustenance	0	0	0	0
1	11. COIN force and government have different goals/levels of commitment	1	1	1	1
NATIONAL SCORES BY YEAR		-6	-7	-6	-6

¹⁵³ Adapted from: Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 78, 252–68, 270–72; McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare.”

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